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REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY: STATE PROCEDURAL RULES 
AND 1·8~ LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
Seymour Moskowitz* 
In the modern era of few trials, the pretrial process is critical to 
the disposition of most cases. Discovery has been a fiercely debated 
subject for may years~ Many c()mmentators believe that discovery 
has become too expensive, very time consuming, and often abusive. 
Others disagree, and articulate an entirely different diagnosis of the 
problems in our civil justice system. Regardless, the scope of discov-
ery, and the process for undertaking it, create predictable advan· 
tages and disadvantages_ for many types of litigants. Although state 
courts dispose of the vast majority of cases in the United States, 
academic writings on procedural matters, particularly discovery, of-
ten overlook this area. This Article focuses on the state court aspects 
of discovery and examines the discovery rules in state courts. The 
Author identifies dramatic changes taking place in these courts. The 
Author summarizes major trends in state rules, and discusses 
changes and experiments in four states Texas, Arizona, Illinois 
and Colorado in detail. The Article alsa analyzes whether changes 
in discoue-ry are likely to create even further increases in the growing 
numbers of summary judgments granted, and whether voluntary 
sharing of information is likely to be successful in our adversary 
litigation system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The courts are an integral part of American society. Millions of 
individual Americans and businesses rely upon the civil justice sys-
tem to resolve issues personal injuries, family law matters, com-
mercial disputes that are of immense importance in their lives. In 
1999, nearly ninety-one and a half million new cases were filed in 
state courts, 1 together with more than two million in the federal 
courts.2 In addition to private cases, courts are a frequent venue for 
issues in th.e public square. De Tocqueville noted in the 1840s that 
law, lawyers and the legal system are central ingredients in our 
American democracy: ''Scarcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question."3 Major public policy issues are routinely decided within the 
context of civil litigation in the United States. Brown v. Board of 
Education, 4 .and its progeny, is a classic example. More recent battles 
have included litigation, primarily in the state courts, about the li-
ability of tobacco c-ompanies to smokers and states to cover costs for 
1. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1999-
2000, at 10 (2000) (examining trends in federal and state caseloads), available at 
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/divisions/research/csp/csp-statOl.html (last visited May 25, 
2002). 
2. ld. 
3. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Henry Reeve ed., 
Vintage Books 1945) (1795). 
4. 34 7 l[_Jr.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools are unconstitu-
tional). 
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smoking related illnesses,5 asbestos manufacturers,6 cases attempt-
ing to ameliorate degradation of the environment, as well as numer-
ous other decisions impacting entire industries.7 
Litigation in the United States has yet another important politi-
cal or societal dimension. At least since the time of Andrew Jackson, 
persistent s~pticism about the ability of public officials to protect 
the interests of ordinary citizens from either their government or 
from damage at the hands of those with wealth and economic power 
has been expressed. As Jackson acknowledged, "[i]t is to be regretted 
that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to 
their selfish purposes .. ., . There are no necessary evils in govern-
ment. Its evils exist only in its abuses."8 
Procedure matters in litigation. As.Leonard Levy has noted, "the 
history of both liberty and constitutional government is in large part 
the history of procedure."9 Moreover, procedural rules allocate power 
between litigants and thus affect substantive results. Although first 
year law students in civil procedure courses across the United States 
study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules") in 
depth, this is often the extent of serious study of civil procedure in 
American legal education. Once in practice, however, these lawyers 
5. See, e.g., CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: How 
THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998). 
6. See, e.g., Acands, Inc. v. Abate, 710 A.2d 944 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (relat-
ing to products liability actions brought by workers who were harmed by exposure to 
asbestos against manufacturers and distributors/installers of asbestos-containing 
products). 
7. See, e.g., Vander Bloemen v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., No. 95-1761). 1996 WL 
346266, at *2 (Wise. Ct. App. June 26, 1996) (holding that the public trust doctrine ap-
plies to the protection of lakeside ecology); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho ex rel. 
Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995) (holding the public trust doctrine conferred 
standing to an environmental group to challenge a timber sale on state forest lands 
because sediment from the logging would harm fish spawning grounds and the bed of 
an appurtenant creek); State v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (suit by the 
Department of Environmental Protection against corporations and individuals based 
on mercury pollution of state waterway); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 
N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981) (deciding a nuisance action to enjoin operator of chemical waste 
disposal site from continued operation); Clark Curriden, Power of 12: Jurors Increas-
ingly are Sending Loud Messages of Censure with Megabuck Verdicts. But Critics 
Charge That a Jury is the Least Qualified Body to Decide Public Policy, 87 ABA J., 
Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 36 (cataloging and describing litigation involving HMOs, Fen-
phert, Tylenol, and other drugs, children's pajamas, and numerous other cases forcing 
businesses and government to change the way they operate). 
8. Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto Message to the Senate (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 
2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 590 (James 
D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
9. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFfH AMENDMENT ix (1968); see also Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (noting that even though "in form the Great Writ is 
simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of 
fundamental rights of personal liberty"). 
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quickly recognize the significance of state procedural rules~ The vast 
majority of legal matters in the United States concern state law and 
the vast majority of these matters entering the court system are filed 
in state venues.1° Civil filings in state courts of general jurisdiction 
increased by thirty-two percent between 1984 and 1999.11 In the fed-
eral courts, new cases filed actually decreased in the same time pe-
riod.12 
In the modern era, ~he pretrial process is critical to the dis_posi-
tion of most cases. The vast majority of cases never go to trial. Sev-
enty-five percent of tort cases in state courts, for example, are dis-
posed of through settlement or voluntary dismissal.13 Those which 
are contested at trial and upon appeal are often decided upon the re-
sults of the information gathering conducted before trial. This is true 
in both private litigation and in public interest cases where "private 
attorneys-general" may only function effectively with court-enforced 
discovery. 14 
The core function of discovery is to seek the truth so disputes 
may be settled by what the facts reveal rather than what facts are 
concealed. 15 Legal disputes should be resolved on a level playing field. 
This Article examines the state of state court pretrial discovery. 
Although in the past state procedure was often patterned after the 
Federal Rules many state rules have now escaped the gravitational 
pull of the federal rules. Some now utilize different discovery proce-
dures in different types of cases, a departure from the "trans-
substantive~' nature of the federal rules.16 Mandatory disclosure is a 
10. The number of state cases dwarfs the federal caseload. While approximately 
91.5 million cases were filed in state courts in 1999, only 2.1 million cases were filed in 
the federal courts in that year. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 14. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Roselyn Bonanti, Tort ~eform' in the States, T:a.IAL, Aug. 2000, at 28; see also 
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Public Policy Report, A Rising Tide of Torts, 71 N.Y. STATE BAR 
J., Apr. 1999, at 41. In New York, only 3.5 percent of all tort cases filed went to trial. 
I d. 
14. At the federal level, Patrick Higginbotham has observed the following: 
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys .. general as an 
enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environ-
mental laws, civil rights, and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits 
must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is 
calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by Congress. 
Patrick Higginbotham, Foreward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997). 
15. See, e~g., Computer Teaching Corp. v. Courseware Applications, Inc., 556 
N.E.2d. 816, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that "(d]is'covery is to be a mechanism for 
the ascertainment of truth" and for creating conditions for a fair trial or a fair settle-
ment). 
16. William W. Schwarzer; In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in Discovery," 27 
GA. L. REV. 655, 657 (1993) (rebutting previous opposition to the provisions of Rule 26 
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central pretrial concept in many jurisdictions, with requirements far 
beyond those mandated in federal courts. 17 A significant number limit 
the traditional discovery tools depositions, interrogatories, requests 
for production of documents, etc. in important ways.18 Some states 
now explicitly require judges to "manage" the pretrial process, and 
mandate or encourage the use of court drafted "standard discovery"19 
in lieu of party ... controlled inforn1ation gathering. 
In the treatise portions of Matthew Bender's Forms of Discov-
ery Volumes 11 to 14 I annually update a detailed analysis of all 
fifty state rules of discovery.20 This Article does not duplicate the 
mass of information presented in the treatise analyzing develop-
ments in all fifty states. Rather, this Article sets out general trends 
and highlights specific state initiatives that offer fresh perspectives 
on pretrial gathering of information in the civil justice system. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the development 
of pretrial discovery and its significance in modern litigation. In 
Parts III and IV, I discuss the controversy which surrounds discovery 
practice in civil cases and changes in state procedure rules which 
were initiated in the past decade. Part V presents an overview of 
general trends in state discovery rules together with vignettes of four 
specific states Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado. These states 
are engaged in a variety of procedural experiments attempting to 
make civil litigation cheaper, faster and more efficient. Part VI looks 
at the interplay between dispositive pretrial motions, particularly 
summary judgment, and discovery rights. Part VII discusses whether 
changes in rules and judicial exhortations to share information be-
tween parties can be expected to change contemporary pretrial prac-
tice and, if not, why not. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRETRIAL INFORMATION GATHERING 
"Mutual knowledge of all of the relevant facts gathered by both 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
17. See discussion infra notes 362-82 and accompanying text. 
18. See discussion infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text. 
19. See discussion infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text. 
20. The rules are summarized in charts or presented in full text and are annually 
compared to the comparable federal discovery rules. See 11 BENDER'S FORMS OF DIS-
COVERY app. B (2001) (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 26 Through 33) [hereinafter BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS]; id. at app. C (State 
Rules Governing Discovery at Variance with the Federal Rules); 12 BENDER'S DISCOV-
ERY FORMS app. E (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
34); id. at app. F (State Rules at Variance with Federal Rule 34); 13 BENDER'S DIS-
COVERY FORMS app. H (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 35 and 36); id. at app. I (State Rules at Variance with Federal Rules 35 and 36); 
14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS app. K (Comparison of State Rules with Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 37 and 45). 
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parties is essential to proper litigation. "21 
Generations of American lawyers have now been educated and 
practiced law under modern discovery concepts and rules. Pretrial 
information gathering under party control has become an integral 
part of our legal culture. Disputes mus~ be decided by courts on the 
facts and the law, after an opportunity for each side to inform itself 
and its opponent of its version of fact and law. Professor Geoffrey 
Hazard has expressed the view that such a right has a "virtually con-
stitutional foundation" in modern American litigation.22 Professor 
Hazard's point, perhaps expressed hyperbolically, is correct. The 
American civil justice system could not function without opportunity 
for each side to gather information to present to each other and to a 
court, if necessary. Indeed, although the vast majority of cases filed 
in the United States never go to trial,23 discovery is an essential part 
of the process by which parties negotiate their own resolution of the 
dispute, and upon which courts dispose of cases by dispositive pre-
trial motions. Without the information gathering devices that civil 
. . 
procedure rules provide, neither side could effectively evaluate the 
strength of its own or its opponent's position.24 Moreover, if the par-
ties were not gathering potential evidence, the huge caseloads in 
American civil courts could scarcely be managed by the courts.25 
Pretrial information gathering is critical, not only to individual 
cases, but also to the political role litigation plays in the United 
21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
22. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665, 
1694 (1998). 
23. Jury trials accounted for only 2% of the 762,000 tort, contract and real property 
cases disposed by state courts of general jurisdiction in the seventy-five largest coun-
ties in the U.S. in 1992. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CML 
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE 
COUNTIES 1 (1995), available at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/cb658.pdf (last vis-
ited May 25, 2002); see also N .Y.State Bar Ass'n, supra note 13, at 40 (reporting that of 
88,781 tort suits disposed of in the New York trial courts in 1996, only 3,088, or 3.5%, 
ended in a jury verdict or a judge's decision, indicating they went to trial); Susan K. 
Gauvey, ASR's Integration in the Federal Court System, MD. B. J., Mar-Apr. 2001, at 
37 (noting that "the vast majority of cases do not go to trial and have never gone to 
trial"). 
24. Depositions, for example, may often be a means of conveying the strength of a 
party's case to the opponents so that a more realistic appraisal of the probability of 
suc~ess may occur. See James W. McElhaney, Should You Hide the Flag? It Can Pay to 
Reveal Case Strengths During Depositions, 84 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 74 (counseling 
that it may pay to reveal case strengths during a deposition because this is the only 
occasion when witnesses will ordinarily testify and it pays to make it clear how strong 
they can be). 
25. See In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985) 
("The whole system of Civil adjudication would be ground to a virtual halt if the courts 
were forced to intervene in even a :modest percentage of discovery transactions."). 
2002] REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY 601 
States. Dean Carrington has noted that discovery is the American al-
ternative to a bureaucratic state: "The superiority of private litiga-
tion over the administrative process was recognized in the years fol-
lowing 1938, when modern discovery was introduced.''26 Progres-
sively, civil procedure has become the instrument for creating public 
reforms and for challenging existing institutional practices. As Mir-
jan Damaska notes, "the objectives of civil litigation became complex 
and multiple . . . . Effective tools of partisan investigation were de-
veloped with an eye toward litigation as an instrument of 'public pol-
icy[ ]' .... "27 
But this access to pretrial information has not always been 
available. The English common law system was characterized by 
rigid, writ-dominated pleadings, limited parties, and single-issue 
cases. These limitations undergirded a process structurally antitheti-
cal to information gathering tools. On the other hand, the practices in 
equity courts provided the basis for modern discovery devices. In "le-
gal" cases, the investigating party generally had to identify specific 
materials as to which discovery was sought.28 Even under "Field" 
Codes in American states, a plaintiff could not even begin discovery 
unless he or she could independently substantiate "facts" stated in a 
complaint.29 There was little opportunity to examine documents that 
might be relevant and useful, use depositions, interrogatories, or 
other tools of information gathering-3° to facilitate the proof of an ex-
isting or new theory of the case.31 In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denounced as a "fishing bill" any effort by a party to "pry into the 
case of his adversary to learn its strength or weakness."32 An example 
of this same attitude in the state courts is found in a Massachusetts 
26. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). 
27. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COM-
PARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 133 (1986). 
28. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26, app. 100 (3d 
ed. 2001) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (describing discovery procedures 
at common law). 
29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989) ("Unde.r the 
codes, a plaintiff could not even begin discovery, unless he or she could independently 
substantiate such suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in a complaint 
that stated facts."). In his 1928 work on code pleadings, Professor Clark described 
twenty-eight states as having adopted the Field Code; none of the remaining jurisdic-
tions still adhered completely to common law pleading. CHARLES CLARK, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928). 
30. See generally GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) (describ-
ing discovery devices and procedures used in various American jurisdictions in 1932). 
31. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 
1979) ("[T]he heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business docu-
ments. Without them, there is virtually no case." (citation omitted)). 
32. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911). 
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case33 where the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied a litigants pe-
tition for discovery, reasoning the following: 
It seems that the real purpose of taking the deposition is merely to 
fish out in advance what the testimony will be . . . . This is what 
Lord Hardwicke termed a "fishing bill," to enable the plaintiff to 
learn whether he may sue his judgment against Kingsbury, and 
levy on the land, with prospect of success ... As a bill of discovery 
only, we think it cannot be maintained.34 
The adoption of the Federal Rules marked a new approach and 
epoch. Charles Clark, former President of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools, and the drafter of the Federal Rules was fond of 
quoting Frankfurter: "New winds are blowing on old doctrines. The 
critical spirit infiltrates traditional formulas .... "35 The Federal 
Rules simplified pleading,36 liberalized joinder of parties and claims,37 
and emphasized ease of litigation rather than technical legal plead-
ing. In the seminal case of Conley v. Gibson,38 the Supreme Court re-
affirmed that Federal Rule 8 only required a plaintiff to give fair no-
tice to the defendant by way of a "short and plain statement of the 
claim."39 The different phases of the pretrial process were mutually 
reinforcing. Another major theoretical and practical feature of the 
1938 procedural revolution was elimination of differing pleading re-
quirements for different types of cases. Professor Clark insisted that 
the concepts of uniformity and simplicity and the decision to merge 
law and equity required the same rules for all cases.40 State proce-
dure rules soon followed the federal model as a majority of the states 
adopted the main features of the new federal procedure.41 
33. Fiske v. Slack, 38 Mass. 361 (1838), available at 1838 WL 2792. 
34. Id. at 4-5; see also In re Abeles, 12 Kan. 451, 453 (1874); In re Cubberly, 18 P. 
173, 173 (Kan. 1888) ("'The taking of the deposition of a party in a pending case, 
merely to fish out in advance what his testimony will be, and to annoy and oppress 
him, and not for the purpose of using the same as evidence, is an abuse of judicial au-
thority and process .... '"). 
35. Charles Clark, What Now?, Address of the President of the Association of 
American Law Schools at the 31'' Annual Meeting (Dec. 28-30, 1933) (quoting Felix 
Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931)), 
reprinted in 20 A.B.A. J. 431-35 (1934). 
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18-24; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com· 
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 982-91 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law]. 
38. 354 u.s. 41 (1957). 
39. Id. at 47; see also Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501 ("The new rules, however, restrict 
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery proc-
ess with a vital role in the preparation for trial"). 
40. Advisory Comm. Transcript (Nov. 14, 1935), quoted in Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law, supra note 37, at 977 n.393. 
41. See 11-14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS, supra note 20, at apps. B, C, E, F, H, I 
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Most scholars give the credit for the innovative discovery con-
cepts embodied in the Federal Rules to Professor Edson R. Sunder-
land.42 A scholar much engaged in the real world, he had consistently 
advocated expanding discovery techniques.43 Professor Subrin notes 
that the initial draft of the Federal Rules distributed for public com-
ment "included every type of discovery that was known in the United 
States and probably England up to that point."44 Sunderland's draft 
went beyond the rules of any particular jurisdiction: 
If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted in individual 
state courts, one finds some precursors to what later became dis-
covery under the Federal Rules; but ... no one state allowed the to-
tal panoply of devices. Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they became 
law in 1938, eliminated features of discovery that in some states 
had curtailed the scope of discovery and the breadth of its use.45 
Responding to the spirit of the new rules, the Supreme Court wrote 
in 1946: "No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" 
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his 
opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered 
by both parties is essential to proper litigation."46 
The original Federal Rules, however, had significant limits upon 
discovery. Examination and production of documents, for example, 
were only available if ordered by the judge. "[l]nspections [of docu-
ments] had always been strictly regulated by the court and the po-
tential for invasion of files had always been feared."47 "Good cause" 
was required to allow production of documents under the original 
Rule 34.48 Over time, these restraints on access to documents were 
& K (providing charts analyzing, collating, and setting out state discovery rules); see 
also John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coons, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of 
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367; 1377-78 (1986) (de-
scribing major trends in the states toward adoption of Federal Rules, albeit with 
changes). 
42. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698-701 (1998) 
[hereinafter Subrin, Historical Background]. 
43. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 
YALE L.J. 863, 872-73 (1933) (describing the benefits of "unrestricted mutual discov-
ery."). 
44. Subrin, Historical Background, supra note 42, at 718. 
45. ld. at 719. 
46. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507; see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 
U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery together with the fair trial procedures make trial 
less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest). 
4 7. WILLIAM GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33 ( 1968). 
48. AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVE-
LAND, OHIO 74-75 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) ("Upon motion of any party showing 
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gradually limited. In 1970, the requirement for prior judicial ap-
proval for document discovery was removed entirely in the federal 
courts.49 
Other changes similarly liberalized discovery. In 1946, the Fed-
eral Rules were amended to make clear that even inadmissible mate-
rial was discoverable so long as it was "reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence."50 In 1948 a number of re-
forms were instituted. The req.uirement of leave of court for taking 
depositions was eliminated. 51 Arbitrary limits on the number or scope 
of interrogatories were eliminated;52 the standard for document pro-
duction and inspection was eased from documents "material" to the 
case to documents "related" to the case.53 In 1970, insurance policies 
were explicitly made discoverable54 and the motion to compel was 
widened to apply to all discovery devices except mental and physical 
exams under Rule 35.55 
In general, state procedure rules followed the federal develop-
ments. In 1935, Judge Clark and Professor Moore had expressed the 
hope that the federal rules might "properly be a model to all the 
states."56 Arizona was the first state in the nation to change .its rules 
of civil procedure to follow the newly adopted Federal Rules.57 Nor-
man Hull, a Phoenix lawyer, argued in favor of Arizona's adoption of 
the federal rules because they were well-reasoned and desirable, and 
because "lawyers practicing before the state . courts would be gov-
erned by the same rules and, when practicing before any federal 
court in the United States they could walk into the courtroom and 
feel at home."58 Although states accommodated to wider discovery at 
different times, a current survey of fifty state -procedure rules shows 
good cause therefore and upon notice to all other parties, the court ... may ... order 
any party to produce ... documents . .. which constitute or contain evidence material 
to any matter involved in the action . ... " (emphasis added)). 
49. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to 
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. 
50. This language is now found at the end of FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l). 
51. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 
433, 453 (1946). . 
52. I d. at 461. 
53. Id. at 463. 
54. Proposed Amendments, supra note 49, at 487. 
55. See id. at 488. The proposal states that Rule 35 was excluded in this expansion 
for two reasons: only a small percentage of exams needed motions, and, more signifi-
cantly, the concern for "the interest of the person to be examined in the privacy of his 
person." I d. 
56. Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 
YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935). 
57. Oakley & Coons, supra note 41, at 1381. 
58. Lyle Roger Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1954). 
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all have incorporated the discovery devices depositions, interrogato-
ries, etc. codified in the federal rules, sometimes modified to meet 
specific state procedure.59 Substantial differences in discovery be-
tween federal and state rules do, however, exist and these variations 
• • are 1ncreas1ng. 
An opportunity to engage in meaningful pretrial information 
gathering is the counterpart to notice pleading60 and an essential 
element in a just dispute resolution system. Liberal discovery is es-
sential to pursue factual support for claims and defenses pleaded in a 
nonspecific manner.61 Almost all states have replaced fact or code 
pleading with a "short and plain statement of the claim"62 by the 
plaintiff or another party. The Supreme Court noted in Conley that 
"[s]uch simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal op-
portunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established 
by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and de-
fense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."63 
Improved discovery is defended on the basis that it cre-ates better 
access to courts and facilitates greater social justice. Cases are no 
longer decided on "sporting" rules that allow surprise evidence- and 
hidden traps for the unwary or misled.64 Just results are more likely 
if both sides have access to information relating to their opponent's 
contentions.65 The long struggle regarding the liability of the tobacco 
companies for damages caused to smokers, their public and private 
insurers, and the public would have been inconceivable without ac-
59. See 11-14 BENDER'S DISCOVERY FORMS, supra note 20, at apps. B, C, E, F, H, I 
& K (providing charts of state discovery rules in the treatise portions). 
60. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (distinguishing the discovery process, which 
provides information for trial, from pleadings, which merely give notice). The term 
"notice pleading" may well be inaccurate because in actual court practice complaints 
(and counterclaims) must give "'fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests."' 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
472-73 (5th ed. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
61. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (describing how pretrial 
information gathering and issue defining are critical to the structure of modern litiga-
tion and these rest upon appropriate discovery methods). 
62. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 8; ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 8; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 8; COLO. R. 
CIV. P. 8; DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 8; DEL. C.P. CT. CIV. R. 8; HAW. R. CIV. P. 8; IDAHO 
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(l); IND. TRIAL R. 8; IOWA R. CIV. P. 70(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-208 (a) 
(1999); KY. R. CIV. P. 8/01; ME. R. Crv. P. 8; MAss. R. Crv. P. 8; MINN. DIST. CT. GEN. 
R. 8.01; MISS. R. CIV. P. 8; MONT. R. CIV. P. 8(a); NEV. R. CIV. P. 8; N.D. R. CIV. P. 8; 
OHIO R. CIV. P. 8; R.I. R. CIV. P. 8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 15-6-S(b); TENN. CIV. P.R. 8; 
UTAH. R. CIV. P. 8; VT. R~ CIV. P. 8; WASH. CIV. P. R. 8; W. VA. R. CIV. P. 8; WYO R. 
CIV. P. 8. 
63. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48. 
64. See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 37, at 945. 
65. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, 
at 39-41 (2d ed. 1994); see also Herbert v. Lando; 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). 
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cess to information possessed mainly by the industry. One aspect of 
the case for comprehensive information sharing is thus based on the 
need to formulate and prove claims on behalf of previously unknow-
ing and damaged individuals. The production of documents and/or 
electronically stored information is typically a plaintiffs best means 
of obtaining evidence to prove a case t4at would be otherwise un-
proveable or to transform merely compensatory damages into a puni-
tive award. Professor Green describes plaintiffs' attorneys in p'roduct 
• 
liability cases, for example, relying on "civil discovery . . . [as] their 
best hope of obtaining information that would reveal whether their 
clients had meritorious claims and, if so, provide the evidence to en-
able their clients to prevail."66 Equity-derived liberal access to infor-
mation allows equity-derived remedies, developed for this purpose in 
institutional reform cases.67 
Some have even argued that developments in substantive law 
areas such as products liability and consumer protection have been 
the result, at least partly, of broad ranging discovery rights.68 The 
Supreme Court has occasionally invoked the existence of broad dis-
covery as pertinent to its handling of substantive issues of· employ-
ment discrimination law. In holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that challenged employment practices actually caused racial imbal-
ances in the work place,69 it rejected arguments that this was unfair 
by pointing to discovery. The Court contended that "[s]ome will com-
plain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome 
on Title VII plaintiffs. But liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs 
broad access to employers' records in an effort to document their 
claims."70 
Similarly, when the Court placed the burden of rebutting an em-
. 
ployer's non-discriminatory justification on employees, it observed 
that its ruling would not "unduly hinder the plaintiff' because of "the 
66. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
MAsS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 15 (1996). 
67. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foun-
dations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (describing "structural re-
form" litigation and judges, particularly federal judges, who use historic equity powers 
to expand rights). 
68. Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981). 
69. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1989). In the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994), Congress arguably codified 
this feature of Wards Cove, but there is debate on the impact of the statutory provi-
• SIOD. 
70. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court added that employers are required to 
maintain records that would provide the sort of information needed to prove causation. 
Id. at 657-58. 
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liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court."71 
Thus, the very structure of employment discrimination statutes as 
interpreted by the Court has, at times, been founded on the availabil-
ity of broad discovery. 
Since 1970, the tide has changed. The thrust ofthe amendments 
to the federal rules sin~e then has been toward containing the cost 
and time expende4 on the exchange of pretrial information. In 1980, 
discovery conferences in federal court were first introduced. In 1983, 
other amendments followed~ The sentence of Rule 26(a}, which pro-
vided that the frequency of use of discovery mechanisms was not to 
be limited, was deleted and a sentenc_e was added to Rule 26(b) per-
mitting courts to limit discovery.72 New Rule 26(g), which encourages 
judges to impose appropriate sanctions for discovery abuse, was also 
added,73 together with an explicit barring of disproportionate discov-
ery.74 In 1993, new automatic disclosure provisions were introduced 
and explicit limits on discovery (depositions and interrogatorie-s) 
were codified.7·5 Amendments to the federal rules expanded the roles 
of judges early in lawsuits by requiring the approval of discovery 
plans.76 
Ill. THE DISCOVERY"ABUSE" CONTROVERSY 
While liberal discovery was one of the major innovations of the 
1938 Federal Rules and the state rules that soon modeled themselves 
upon them, dissenting views _as to its propriety and costs have always_ 
been present. Even before the rules were completed, Robert Dodge of 
Boston and Senator Claude Pepper were fearful that unsavory plain-
tiffs' lawyers would use_ discovery to ''blackmail'; corporations and 
their officers.77 In 1936, Judge Edward Finch of the New York Court 
of Appeals criticized the discovery provisions, warning that the pro-
71. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)~ The Court also 
pointed out that the claimant would have access to the investigative file compiled by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ld. 
72. FED. R. CIV. P~ 26 cmt. -3. 
73. See FED. R. CIV. P~ 26 (advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments). See 
. . 
generally Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Cost & Delay: The Potential Impact of the 1983 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 JUDICATURE 363 (1983). 
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
75. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d)t 26(£). Rule 30 was revised to require leave of -court if 
more than ten depositions were desired. Amended Rule 33 limited the number of in-
terrogatories to thirty. See Amendments to the Federal Rflles of Civil Procedure,, 146 
F.R.D. 40 (1993). 
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
77. See Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Ciui'l 
Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 1936) (statement of 
Senator George Wharton Pepper) [hereinafter Proceedings of the Advisory Committee], 
quoted in Subrin, Historical Background, supra note 42, at 720--22. 
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posed rules would "increase so-called speculative litigation or litiga-
tion based upon suspicion rather than facts, with the hope that such 
fishing may reveal a good cause of action as alleged or otherwise."78 
In his view, the rules gave so many tools to the person asserting a 
claim "that it will be cheaper and more to the self-interest of the de-
fendant to settle for less than the cost to resist."79 William D. 
Mitchell, Chairman of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, pre-
dicted: . "We are going to have an outburst against this discovery 
business unless we can hedge it about with some appearance of 
safety against fishing expeditions."80 
These statements in the pre-Federal Rules 1930's sound decid-
edly contemporary. There have been a plethora of recent articles and 
surveys in which prominent critics describe discovery practice as a 
major problem.81 In the view of these detractors, discovery has be-
come too expensive, too time consuming, and often abusive. Thomas 
Zlaket, author of Arizona's new discovery rules, articulates this in-
dictment and argues the previous rules encouraged lawyers to act in 
an overly aggressive and adversarial manner.82 Professor Arthur 
Miller writes that discovery has become both an unnecessary expense 
and a major cause of delay in modern litigation.83 Judge William W. 
Schwarzer, an ardent proponent of change at the federal level, views 
the pretrial process as out of control: "Discovery, originally conceived 
as the servant of the litigants to assist them in reaching a just out-
come, now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict disproportion-
ate costs and burdens."84 
78. Hon. Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the Pre-
liminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 
• 
22 A.B.A. J. 809, 809 (1936). 
79. Id. at 810. 
80. Proceedings of the Advisory Committee, supra note 77, at 722. 
81. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery The Rush to 
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992) (referring to our "litigious society" and criticizing 
litigation cost and delay); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific 
Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 189 (1992); 
Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills?, 25 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 249 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent's 
Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by 
Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793. For a compila-
tion of studies addressing discovery under the Federal Rules, see Charles W. Sorenson, 
Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) "Much Ado About Noth-
ing?," 46 HAsTINGS L.J. 679, 697 n.57 (1995). 
82. Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil 
Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1993). 
8~. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 8-9 (1984). 
84. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discov-
ery Reform, 50 U. Pl'IT. L. REV. 703 (1998). 
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While many perceive discovery practice as a serious problem, 
others maintain there is little empirical evidence to support what 
they label as the "pervasive myth of pervasive discovery abuse.''85 As 
Professor Sorenson concludes: 
[L]ittle· empirical research has been done to objectify and quantify 
discovery abuse .... [C]laims of discovery abuse have rested largely 
on nonevidence and may well be generally exaggerated. Frequently 
the assertions of the extent of discovery abuse do not rest on evi-
dence, but only cite to another writer making a similar claim or 
simply make a conclusory statement that derives its strength from 
the fact that it has been repeated so frequently. 86 
These commentators conclude that "discovery normally works well, 
and that liberal discovery is on balance a functioning system used ef-
fectively in more than half of lawsuits filed.''87 
Defenders of party-controlled liberal pretrial information gather-
ing point to empirical studies that challenge the discovery abuse hy-
pothesis. One study of Iowa state trial courts reported that only 
twenty-five percent of all cases had any formal discovery and few of 
those involved extensive discovery. 88 Most Iowa judges and attorneys 
surveyed felt abuse existed only in a small minority of cases.89 The 
National Center for State Courts examined discovery activity in trial 
courts in Boston, New Haven, Kansas City, Seattle, and Shelton 
(Washington). It found that no discovery at all was generated in 
forty-two percent of 2,190 c·ases sampled, but that discovery was sig-
nificantly higher in some courts than others.90 Discovery was more 
frequent and higher in volume in tort cases, particularly malpractice 
and product liability cases, in contrast to almost no discovery initi-
ated in contract and property cases. The Civil Litigation Research 
Project (the "CLRP"), at the University of Wisconsin studied "ordi-
85. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Dis-
covery Abuse and the Consequences far Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 
(1994). 
86. Sorenson, supra note 81, 703-04. 
87. Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure 
Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 
REV. LITIG. 77, 87 (1992). 
88. Sorenson, supra note 81, at 706 n.92 (citing DavidS. Walker, Professionalism 
and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 759, 781, 783-86, 789 
(1989)). Similar data was reported in a larger 1993 study of discovery in state courts. 
Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1440-42. 
89. Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1440-42. 
90. See Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts Out of Con-
trol?, 17 ST. CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8·17 (summarizing relevant data); see also Susan 
Keilitz et al., Attorneys' Views of Civil Discovery, 32 JUDGES' J., Spring 1993, at 2-6 
(reporting the results of the study). The number of requests per case showed a mean of 
6.4 and a median of 4. I d. This suggests that most of the cases are clustered together 
in the lower range of discovery volume. 
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nary litigation": cases in which more than $1,000 was in controversy, 
but excluding ''mega cases." In these cases., the CLRP found that 
"relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit. We found 
no evidence of discovery in over half our cases."91 
The Federal Judicial Center (the "FJC") used a case-based meth-
odology to examine discovery activity in 3,000 terminated cases in six 
urban federal district courts in 1978. The purpose of the FJC study 
was to provide data about federal discovery practice. This investiga-
tion again confirmed the results reported by the National Center for 
State Courts. The study reported that no discovery requests were 
filed in fifty two percent of the cases, and that fewer than five per-
cent of the cases had more than ten discovery requests. 92 Over three 
decades, empirical research has shown "the typical case has rela-
tively little discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the 
stakes of the litigation, .and ... discovery generally but with notable 
exceptions yields information that aids in the just dispositions of 
cases."93 
While there are sharp disagreements on the merits and costs of 
pretrial information gathering, there is also spirited debate about 
precisely what constitutes ''abuse." As discussed above, many com-
plain of excessive., inappropriate, and overly expensive discovery. 
This view posits that parties, principally plaintiffs, use discovery as a 
tactical weapon to impose excessive costs on the other side, thus im-
posing unfair settlements. Unnecessary, numerous and lengthy 
depositions and voluminous interrogatories are employed to exhaust 
91. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 
90 (1983). 
92. Mullenix, supra note 85, at 1434-35 (citing PAUL R. Co~~OLLYET AL., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIONPROCESS: DISCOVERY 
(1978)). 
93. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998)~ 
Another study by the Rand Corporation was based on 5,222 cases filed in 1992-93 in 
20 federal districts. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further 
Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 618 
(1998). Excluded from its sample were the cases which usually involved little or no dis-
covery or management: prisoner cases, administrative review of social security cases, 
bankruptcy appeals, foreclosures, forfeiture and penalty cases, and debt recovery. 55% 
' 
of the remaining cases had little or no discovery. ld. at 635-36. In more than a third of 
these cases, there was no lawyer discovery activity. Similarly, the Federal Judicial 
Center studied 1,000 cases closed in the last quarter of 1996 that were likely to involve 
discovery. This F JC study excluded social security appeals, student loan collections, 
foreclosures, default judgments and cases terminated within 60 days of filing. See 
Willging, supra, at 528. This excludes about 55% of the ci vii docket. ld. at 595. The 
F JC concluded the median cost of discovery was about $6,500 per client (about half of 
median litigation costs). Relative to the stakes involved in these cases, the FJC found 
that discovery expenses were quite low.Jd. at 531. 
• 
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the opponent.94 A contrary view, however, defines abuse as resistance 
to legitimate information requests in the hope of either avoiding dis-
closure or simply buying time and increasing costs for the opponent. 
These tactics include: refusing to provide or hiding information, rais-
ing frivolous claims of privilege, intentionally construing discovery 
requests narrowly, coaching witnesses to avoid disclosing informa-
tion) and providing deliberately evasive answers to legitimate re-
quests.95 
Inextricably intertwined with this debate about the existence of 
"abuse" of the discovery process is the tendency to conflate "discovery 
reform" with "tort reform".96 Some maintain arguments in favor of 
reduced cost ad greater efficiency in discovery are disguised attempts 
to promote the interests of repeat corporate defendants and their in-
surers.97 
IV. THE CONSTRICTION OF DISCOVERY 
. . . . 
Similar to developments in federal procedure, the trend to limi-
tations on discovery in state courts began in the 1970s. By 1980, at 
least eleven states had placed express limits on the use of interroga-
tories.98 In 1981, the Texas Supreme Court ordered that, without 
agreement or leave of court, only two sets of interrogatories were 
permitted, each having a number of questions including subdivisions 
"so as not to require more than thirty answers." 99 California limited 
interrogatories to thirty-five in 1986.100 
The increasing volume of cases was a major factor contributing 
94. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 3 (recognizing that "huge numbers of interrogatories, 
marathon depositions, voluminous document requests and other similar tactics have 
become today's norn1"). 
95. Sorenson, supra note 81, at 699-700. Professor Wolfson summarizes this prob-
lem by noting that the cause of discovery abuse inheres in a litigation approach char-
acterized by the maxim; "never be candid, never be helpful, and make your opponent 
fight for everything he seeks." Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Aduersarittl Di-
lemma ofCiuil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 45 (1988). 
96. See Carrington, supra note 26, at 53. 
97. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 
U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 538 (1986) (stating that "many defendants (and their attorneys) in 
products liability and antitrust cases have championed the curtailment of discovery"); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity and Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1997) 
(referring to "intensive lobbying efforts of segments of the business community"). 
98. See, e.g., GA. CODE 81A-133(a); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 33(a)(3); IOWA R. CIV. P. 
126(a); KAN. S. CT. R. 135(b); ME. R. CIV. P. 33; MD. R. CIV. P. 417(a)(2); MA. R. CIV. P. 
33; MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01; OR. R. CIV. P. 36(A) (does not permit use of interrogato-
ries); R.I. R. Crv. P. 33(b); S.C.R. CIR~ CT. PRAC. 90 (limits to 6 standard interrogato-
ries). 
99. TEX. R. CIV. P. 186(5). 
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 2030(c)(i) (West Supp. 1991). 
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to checks on open-ended information gathering.101 The large number 
of state court cases and their inability to be handled expeditiously 
was already noted in 1986 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ordered that civil cases (with the exception of family law cases) 
be disposed of "within 24 months after filing."102 The order noted that 
the need to attack the "excessive delay and excessive cost" of litiga-
tion103 Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey noted this was largely "a 
product of a chronic shortage of judges .... "104 The priority given to 
criminal cases intensifies the problem of backlogged civil cases and 
further decreases resources available for them!' 
• 
The high volume of cases, shortage of judges and courtrooms, 
and other deficiencies in the infrastructure needed to handle cases 
are widely acknowledged today. In 1999, more than ninety-one mil-
lion new cases were filed in state courts nationwide, almost the exact 
number filed in 1998.105 Two-thirds of states experienced difficulty in 
maintaining the flow of criminal and civil cases. 106 For example, the 
number of tort suits pending in the New York Supreme Court a 
trial court in New York increased by fifty-eight percent between 
1988 and 1996.107 The average case took forty-seven months to be 
processed to final disposition.108 Many Colorado trial judges currently 
have an active case docket of from 800 to 1,300 cases109 which, if han-
dled equally, would allow the judge in a 2,000-hour work year to 
spend less than three hours on each case. The average case process-
ing time from filing of the complaint to final verdict or judgment in 
cases actually tried in the seventy-five largest counties in the United 
States was 25.6 months in 1996.110 
101. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the So~ 
cial Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES. 575, 612 n.1 (1997) ("The 
volume of cases filed in 1994 in state courts was approximately 86.4 million .... "). 
102. Order of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (April 7, 1986), quoted in 
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. ·PENN. L. REV. 1999, 2038 (1989). 
103. Id. 
104. Edward F. Hennessey, 12th Annual Report to the Bar, 73 MAss. L. REV. 3, 11 
(1988). 
105. NATtL CTR. ON STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 14. 
106. Jennifer L. Reichert, Tort Filings Decline in State Courts, Study Shows, TRIAL, 
May 1999, at 100. 
107. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 13, at 40. 
108. !d. at 42. 
109. Colorado State Court Admin.'s Office, Third Quarterly Report, Fiscal Year 
1999. 
110. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CML TRIAL CASES 
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 13. 
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V. THE STATES AS ''LABORATORIES" 
A. General Trends 
Justice Brandeis praised the ability of states to be "laboratories" 
. . 
i.n which experiments in the law might be conducted.111 Procedure 
rules illustrate this. Analysis of the changes in the discovery provi-
sions of the fifty state rules of civil procedure over the past fifteen 
years reveals a very complex ~ituation. Most state rules follow the 
general outlines of federal procedure; numerous differences, however, 
exist. A number of trends are noticeable. First, many state rules now 
employ different procedures for information gathering in different 
types of cases.112 Second, party-initiated and controlled discovery is 
now qualified in many states. Judges often now actively manage this 
process. The type and amount of discovery is often explicitly gov-
erned by court, with some states creating court--drafted and initiated 
discovery.113 Third, while only some states use mandatory disclosure 
of information by parties, a very large number of states have placed 
limits on the amount of discovery parties may employ.114 
One of the express goals of previous procedural reform in both 
federal and state courts was to create "trans-substantive" rules of 
• 
civil procedure, i.e., uniform stand.ards for all types of cases.115 That 
concept is under sharp attack today. Should discovery in simple slip-
and .. fall tort cases be processed in the same fashion as complex prod ... 
uct liability rnatters or class actions? This issue has been the subject 
of ongoing debate. 116 Disparate cases inay involve different numbers 
of parties, potential witnesses, complexity of damage calculations, 
and other factors. 
Many states now divide cases by subject matter or other charac-
teristics. In Arizona, medical malpractice cases have their own 
. . 
rules.117 In New York, interrogatories and depositions are mutually 
exclusive, except with leave of court, in cases seeking recovery for 
personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death based solely on 
111. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). 
112. See discussion infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text. 
113. See discussion infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text. 
114. See discussion infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. 
115. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 29, at 2244-46. 
116. See, e.g., infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
117. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (requires exchange of all relevant medical records; ex-
change of uniform interrogatories and a request for production of specified documents 
prior to the Rule 16(c) comprehensive pretrial conference). 
• 
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negligence. 118 Some states limit discovery by prisoners. 119 Colorado120 
and Alaska121 have special rules for discovery in domestic relations 
matters. 
Cases are often differentiated by the amount in controversy. 
Alaska Rule 26(g) permits only limited discovery and requires expe-
• 
dited calendaring for personal injury or property damages cases in-
volving less than $100,000.122 In South Carolina, Rule 35(a) bans 
physical or mental examinations unless the case involves more than 
$100,000.123 Texas124 and Illinois126 have chosen $50,000 in controversy 
as the dividing point for discovery rights. Some states bar all discov-
ery except by agreement of parties or leave of court where the action 
is in a particular court or involves less than a stipulated amount. 126 
Categorizing cases based on the amount in controversy is common 
and familiar in a society which values efficiency, but raises questions 
of fairness. 
State court judges now "manage" the pretrial process in numer-
ous ways. In addition to the now standard discovery and pretrial con-
ferences, many state rules of procedure explicitly give judges the 
power to determine how much discovery will be allowed, when, and 
by what means. 127 In many states, judges now immerse themselves in 
the pretrial process. They learn a great deal about the litigants, their 
claims, and the evidence long before a trial begins. This raises le-
gitimate concerns about fairness and impartiality,128 because discre-
118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3130(1). 
119. See, e.g., WIS. R. CIV. P. 804.015. 
120. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.2. 
121. ALAsKA R. Crv. P. 26.1. 
122. ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
123. S.C. R. Crv. P. 35(a). 
124. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a). 
125. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(a). 
126. E.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.302(A)(2) (providing that in District Court no discovery is 
permitted). Under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 600.8301, Michigan District 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does 
not exceed $25,000.00. S.C. R. CIV. P. 33 likewise prohibits depositions for cases under 
$10,000.00 and interrogatories if the value of the case is not more than $25,000.00. 
127. See, e.g., Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 
("Supreme Court Rule 214 confers wide discretion on the trial judge in control of pre-
trial discovery."); Indus. Coatings Group, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 658 N.E.2d 
1338, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("The law in Illinois recognizes that a circuit court not 
only has wide discretion in controlling the course of discovery, but also to enter appro-
priate orders to enforce the requirement that a party act with diligence in pursuing 
discovery and moving a case to a conclusion."). 
128. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982); 
Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
305, 314 (1986). 
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tion is almost without bounds at this stage. 129 Appellate courts will 
not ordinarily overturn such rulings. 130 Indeed, many pretrial deci-
sions, especially discovery disputes, are made off the record, or sim· 
ply announced and entered into the record without supporting opin-
ions or reasons. As Professor Malot recognizes: "Judges deciding how 
to manage cases on their dockets have a wide array of tactics avail· 
able and, indeed, choose to exercise their supervisory discretion in 
widely disparate ways, even ·when handling the same exact case."131 
The discretionary and often irreviewable power of trial courts in the 
pretrial process is aptly described by a Colorado Supreme Court Jus-
tice: "While an appellate court may have the opportunity to reverse 
any individual trial judge once every few years, I know that trial 
judges, in their numerous workday rulings, reverse appellate courts 
every day."132 Moreover, decisions directing compliance with discovery 
orders are typically not final, appealable orders.133 
Very broad sanctions, including contempt, are available134 and a 
trial court's determination of sanctions will 'likewise not be disturbed 
absent abuse of discretion.135 Dean Carrington, referring to the fed-
eral district courts, characterizes judges with such powers as "chan-
cellors sitting on the woolsack of autocratic power and less like offi~ 
129. See, e.g.,_ Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs~, 995 P.2d. 721, 732 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1999) (determining that a trial court did not abuse discretion by denying 
sanctions for failure to disclose documents); In re Kelly Rogers, 43 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2001) (determining that a trial court did not abuse discretion by ordering re-
deposition of four witnesses). 
130. Compare D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (Ill. 1997) (holding that a "trial 
court did not ,err in determining that the subject matters were to be discussed"), and 
Ruane v. Amore, 677 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a circuit 
court "did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motions to reopen discovery 
and to disclose an expert witness"), with Vitacco v. Eckberg, 648 N.E.2d 1010, 1013, 
208 Ill. Dec. 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a "trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied plaintiffs motion to ·compel a more complete answer to the interroga-
tory"). 
131. Jonathan T. Malot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in 
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955~ 1004. (1998). 
13.2. Hon. Gregory Kellam Scott, Judge-Made Law: Constitutional Duties & Obliga-
tions under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 517 (1999). I 
thank Prof. Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin Law School for bringing this 
reference to my attention. 
133. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 614 N .E.2d 423, 425-426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(finding that discovery orders imposing sanctions are not final and appealable); Brown 
v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 484 N.E.2d 369, 370 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that an enforcement order by trial court for production of 
records is not final and thus not app_ealable). 
134. See discussion infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Colis v. City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 951, 980-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); 
B& Y Heavy Movers, Inc. v. Fluor Constructors, Inc., 570 N .E.2d 777, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991). 
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cers of the law accountable for their exercise of official power."136 In 
the federal courts, much of pretrial litigation is overseen by magis-
trates who will not preside at the trial unless the parties consent.137 
The use of magistrates or similar personnel is far less common in 
state courts. 
. 
Without pressing the analogy, some of these rules nudge state 
trial judges closer to a civil.law138 approach to the pretrial stage.139 As 
Professor· Hazard finds, "[t]he practice of judicial gathering of evi-
dence, jn distinction to party generated efforts, is a major distinction 
between civil law and other systems of litigation and our own [com-
mon law] modern civil procedure.'n4o A number of states allow judges 
to determine what is a "complex" case and then to determine the 
course of discovery.141 In Colorado, all discovery is under the control 
of a "case management order." 142 
An accelerating trend in state civil procedure rules is the prom-
ulgation and use of court created, rather than lawyer-initiated, dis-
covery. In Arizona, there are currently twenty-two standard uniform 
interrogatories for personal injury actions and twenty-three standard 
uniform interrogatories for contract actions~ 143 Connecticut uses form 
interrogatories in cases of personal injury actions arising from the 
ope,ration or ownership of a motor vehicle or the ownership, mainte-
nance, or control of real property.144 New Jersey145, Colorado, 146 Flor-
• 
136. Paul P. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for 
Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 456, 46-3 (2000). 
137. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). 
138. Civil law jurisdictions usually follow the French or German model rather than 
the English common law tradition. For an introduction to these and other legal tradi-
tions, see generally RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 
THE WORLD TODAY (3d ed. 1985) . 
. . 
139. DAMASKA, supra note 28, at 101 ("[l]n common law systems, the parties per-
form a number of activities that are intrinsic to the office of the judge on the conti-
nent"); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure Reflections on the Comparison of 
Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1960) (explaining that in the German system 
the court does not rely on the parties to bring relevant law forward, and judges play a 
central role in leading the parties to the development of their case). 
140. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdic~ 
• 
tions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1998). 
141. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(a),(b); ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a)(l}; see also VT. R. 
Crv. P. 16, CAL. SUP. CT. CASE MG'i'. R. 2106, JUD. ADMIN. STD. § 19. 
142. COLO. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33. 
143. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1; For applicability of these interrogatories, see ANN. OF R. 
PRAC. SUP. CT. ARIZ. XVII, app., at 163~68. 
144. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13·6(b); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-6(b) (limiting inter-
rogatories in personal injury actions alleging liability based on the operation or owner-
ship of a motor vehicle to Forms 106.10A, 106.10B, or 106.10C); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 
13·9(a) (limiting requests for production to "Forms 106.lla, 106.llb, and/or 106.1lc"). 
145. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(1). 
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ida,147 Maryland,148 South Carolina149 and others150 likewise encourage 
or require the use of pattern discovery in specific types of cases. Cali-
fornia has uniform sets of interrogatories for different types of 
cases.151 
Powerful incentives are employed to encourage the use of these 
court-initiated forms. Numerical limits are placed, for example, on 
the number of interrogatories, requests for admission and other dis-
covery. Party initiated interrogatories must typically count each sub-
part as a single interrogatory. Uniform interrogatories, on the other 
hand, even those containing subparts, are counted as one. 152 
In some states, automatic discovery is in effect. A party is 
deemed to have been automatically served with applicable form in-
terrogatories or other requests for information without any actual 
request.153 New Jersey utilizes "pattern" interrogatories in this man-
ner. 154 The opposite party, once a case is filed, must automatically re-
spond to the court-created discovery without service of any paper.155 
A number of states require mandatory disclosure of certain in-
formation by the parties within a specified period of time. 166 Just as 
significant, there are often limits on particular discovery tools. At 
least thirty-four states limit interrogatories; many permit thirty157 
146. COLO. R. Crv. P. Form 21.2 (providing unifortn Requests for Production in do-
mestic relations matters). 
147. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a) (requiring that "if the Supreme Court has a form of in-
terrogatories for the type of action, the initial interrogatories shall be in the forrn ap-
proved by the Court"). 
148. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a) (counting court "form" interrogatories only as a single 
interrogatory). 
149. S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(l)-(b)(7) (setting out standard form interrogatories to be 
used). 
150. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 2030(c), 2033.5; CONN. 
SUPER. CT. R. §§ 13-6, 13-9. 
151. See Mark A. Neubauer, Check-the-Box Pleadings, 11 LITIG. No. 2 , at 28, 29, 54 
(Winter 1985) (discussing California's form complaints). 
152. See, e.g., MD. R. Crv. P. 2-421(a). 
153. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(2); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-6 (allows service of 
Notice of Interrogatories in lieu of actually serving the interrogatories set forth in the 
forms); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-8(a) (provides no objection may be filed with respect 
to interrogatories set forth in the form). 
154. N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(2). 
155. ld. 
156. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 26; ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d); 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
157. ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 33(a); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 213(c) (except 
for standard fortns of interrogatories for different classes of cases under Rule 213(j)); 
IOWA R. CIV. P. 126(a); KY. R. CIV. P. 33.01(3); ME. R. CIV. P. 33(a); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-
421(a); MAss. R. CIV. P. 33(a); MISS. CT. R. 33(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3233A. 
(West Supp. 2001); R.I. CT. R. 33(b); VA. S. CT. R. 4:8(g); WYO. R. CIV. P. 33. 
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but some allow more158 and some less.159 State rules often restrict the 
number160 and length161 of depositions. California, Iowa, and Okla-
homa all limit requests for admissions. 162 Numerical limits are im-
posed on all parties to a suit, without regard for which party has the 
burden of proof, or the feasibility of other discovery devices. In many 
cases, this may create inequities. 
Maine is experimenting with a new informal process for quickly 
resolving discovery disputes. 163 In this jurisdiction, such disputes are 
not handled via the normal and traditional in court motions to com-
. . . 
pel, but rather through alternate means. Maine Rule 26(g) empha-
sizes the oral resolution of discovery issues. 164 If written materials 
must be examine.d in order to resolve a discovery dis.pute, the moving 
party must briefly describe the dispute in a letter and provide limited 
written materials to the judge. 165 No written argument is allowed 
without prior leave of court.166 
Time limits for the completion of discovery are commonly im-
posed. Utah Rule 26(d) requires no more than 240 days to complete 
158. ALA. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing 40); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a) (allowing 40); CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE. § 2030(c) ( allowing 35); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing 
40); GA. R. CIV. P. 9-11-33 (allowing 50); HAW. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing 60) (cross 
referencing Haw. R. Cir. Ct. 30(b)); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 33(a)(3) (allowing 40); LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC ANN. art 1457B (West Supp. 2001) (allowing 35); MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a) 
(allowing 50); MONT. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (allowing 50); NEB. R. GIV. P. 33 (allowing 50); 
NEV. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (allowing 40), N.H., SUPER. CT. R. 36 (allowing 5); N.C. R. CIV. P-. 
33 (allowing 50); OHIO R. Crv. P. 33(A) (allowing 40); S.C. R. CIV. P. 33 (up to 50 inter-
rogatories where. the amount ~n controversy is greater than $25,000); W.VA. R. CIV. P. 
33(a) (allowing 40); see also N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(b)(1) (interrogatories in sp.ecified 
cases are limited to Uniform Interrogatories in Appendix II, plus 10 supplemental 
ql):estions without subparts). 
159. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(3) (limiting to 25 the number of Level 1 discovery inter:.. 
roga,tories); TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(3) (Level2 discovery); UTAH R. CIV. P. 33 (limiting 
interrogatories to 25:)~ 
.· 
160. ALASKA R. CIV., P. 30, 31(a)(2)(A); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (no depositions upon 
oral examination .except for document custodians); D.C. SUPER CT. R. CIV. P. 30, 31; 
ME. R. CIV. P. 30(a), 31; S.C. R. CIV. P-. 30 (no depositions allowed for cases of less than 
$10,0.00); UTAH R. CIV. P. 30, 31; VA. S. CT. R. 4:6A; WYO. R. CN. P. 30(a)(2), 31. 
161. ILLS. CT. R. 206(d); ME. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2); TEX. R. CN. P. 190.2(c)(2) (Level 1 
. . . 
discovery), 190.3(b)(2) (Level 2 discovery), l99.5(c) (individual witness). 
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 2033(c)(l), (2), (3) (West 1999); IOWA R. CIV. P. 127(a); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3236A. (West 1993). 
163. ME. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
164. Id. 
165. ld. 
166. ME. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l). The Advisory Committee Notes state that "[p]rior to the 
amendment, it was not unusual for a discovery motion to wait several months to be 
reached on the civil motion list and for the case to be completely stalled during that 
period.'' See 14 ME. B. J. 110, 112 (1999). 
2002] REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY 619 
discovery after an answer is filed. 167 This is replicated in many of the 
other states. 168 A number of jurisdictions have gone even further in 
transforming the pretrial process. I turn now, with closer examina-
tion, to these experiments. 
B. Specific Case Studies 
1. Texas 
Reform of the civil discovery rules in Texas began in 1991. Over 
a period of eight years, a variety of study groups drafted, solicited 
comments, and debated proposed revisions. 169 The new Texas discov-
ery rules became effective January 1, 1999,170 and applied to pending 
cases as well as newly filed cases after that date. 171 The overall pur-
pose of the changes was to make pretrial inforn1ation gathering con-
sistent with Rule 1 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Texas 
Rules") ''to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication 
of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive 
law."172 The revisions were to reduce "costs, delays and misuse" asso-
ciated with discovery practice.173 The scope of discovery was left unal-
tered; parties may obtain discovery of any matter that is not privi-
leged and is relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence.174 
The revision's most salient characteristic is limits on the volume 
167. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
168. See, e.g., KA.N. R. CIVP. 26.1 (requiring discovery to be "completed four months 
after the case becomes at issue"); VA. Loc. R. 26(D)(3) (asserting that "parties shall 
complete all forms of expert disclosure and discovery not later than 30 days after the 
date upon which the plaintiff [must] ... disclose a contradictory or rebuttal evidence"). 
169. The revisions of the discovery rules followed similar procedural reforms in 
other aspects of Texas court practice. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were 
revised and became effective September 1, 1997. In March of 1998, a new combined set 
of evidence rules for civil and criminal cases were jointly promulgated by the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal. TEX. R. EVID. 101. The devel-
opments in the new discovery system in Texas are exhaustively detailed in Kenneth E. 
Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates and Compromises, 20 REV. 
LITIG. 89 (2000). 
170. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190-215. 
171. A few exceptions were made in order to avoid unfairness to parties in previ-
ously filed cases. See, e.g., TEX. R. Crv. P. 193 (concluding material, which exempted 
parties from updating existing discovery responses to comply with the new rules). 
172. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1. 
173. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING THE 1999 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
RULES OF CML PROCEDURE GOVERNING DISCOVERY, Order of Aug. 5, 1998. 
174. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). This standard, however, must be read in light of re-
cent cases concerning scope of law discovery under the former rules. Rule 192, cmt. 1 
(incorporating recent cases including Texaco v. Sanderson, 898 S.W. 3d. 813 (Tex. 
1995) and Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). 
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of discovery. Texas Rule 190 divides cases into categories and codifies 
limits on discovery in each category. Three tiers of "discovery control 
plans" are created denominated Levels 1, 2, and 3. Each civil case 
must be in one category at all times. 175 While assignment to Level 1 
or 2 is determined by rule, Level 3 may only be activated by court or-
der.176 The limits imposed by Rule 190 complement other specific lim-
its in the discovery rule-s.177 Parties are permitted, except where pro-
hibited, to modify any procedure or limitation by _agreement.178 
Level 1 cases involve monetary reli~f of $50,000 or less 179 and di-
vorces that do not involve children where the value of the marital es-
tate is less than $50,000.180 Discovery is limited severely in these 
cases: for example, each party is restricted to six hours of oral deposi ... 
tions, 181 interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five, 182 and all other 
limitations set by other rules apply. 183 The choice to place a case in 
Level 1 is made by the plaintiffs pleadings, but they may later be 
amended to invoke Level 2 later. Additional discovery in Level 1 is 
only permitted by agreement or court order. 184 If a timely filed plead-
ing later renders placement in Level 1 inapplicable, discovery re-
opens, and the rules governing the new discovery level will apply.185 
Defendants may transfer a case to Level 2 by asserting their own af-
firmative claim for relief that falls outside the scope of Level 1 or by 
seeking a court order.186 
Level 2 is the default category. It applies when Level 1 is inap-
plicable and when a court has not entered a Level 3 discovery plan.187 
Under Level 2, parties use the ordinary Texas discovery rules with 
specified limits. In non ... family law matters, ,discovery must be com~ 
pleted within a "discovery period," i.e., thirty days before the set trial 
date or nine months after the earlier of the date of the first oral 
deposition or the due date of the first response to a written discovery 
175. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.1 & cmt. 1 (1999). 
176. Id. 
177. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.6 & cmt. 5 (1999). 
178. E.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(2) & cmt. 1 (determining that parties in Level 1 
cases cannot agree to permit more than ten hours of deposition per party). 
179. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a)(l) & cmt. 1 (1999). 
180. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(a)(2) & cmt. 2 (1999). 
181. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(2). This may be extended to ten hours by agreement. 
I d. 
182. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(c)(3). 
183. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2. 
184. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(b); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1. Plaintiff is, how-ever, 
required to obtain leave of court to amend pleadings to change discovery levels within 
45 days of trial, which may be granted only for good cause. TEX. R. CIV. P. l90.2(b). 
185. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2(d). 
186. TEX. R. CIV. P. l90.2(b)(2)-(3). 
187. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(a), cmt. 1 (1999). 
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request in the case. 188 An aggregate limit of fifty hours is imposed on 
each side to depose parties, persons subject to those parties' control, 
and experts retained by opponents.189 Interrogatories are limited to 
twenty-five. 190 
Discovery in Level 3 cases (complex cases that do not fit Levels 1 
and 2) is overtly managed by the court. 191 The trial judge determines 
discovery periods, limitations on the amount of discovery, deadlines 
for pleading, and any other matter that may be addressed in a pre-
trial scheduling order under Rule 166.192 The court may modify any 
discovery procedure or limit information gathering for "good cause."193 
The trial judge has wide latitude in managing the pretrial phase. 
The revised Rules make explicit new demands. Parties and their 
attorneys are admonished to cooperate in discovery and to make rea-
sonable agreements for the efficient disposition of the case.194 A 
signed certificate that such a reasonable attempt was "made to re-
solve the dis·pute" without court intervention must accompany "[a]ll 
discovery motions or requests for hearings."195 Civility in pretrial pro-
ceedings is expected. All depositions are to be conducted as if they 
were in court.196 Counsel are enjoined to ''be courteous to each other 
and to the witnesses;" witnesses are admonished not to be evasive or 
delaying. 197 Private conferences between a witness and his or her law-
yer are strictly limited. 198 Coaching and colloquy are prohibited, and 
restrictions are imposed about how objections are to be presented. 199 
"Argumentative or suggestive objections or explanations" are prohib-
ited.200 In addition, Rule 192.4, modeled on Rule 26(b)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules, gives the trial court power to limit any discovery if it is 
188. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1)(B). The exception for Family Code cases recognizes 
that the size of the marital estate and the other issues inherent in disposition of such 
cases are often in flux until the time of trial. I d. 
189. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(2). 
190. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(3). 
191. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4, 4(a). 
192. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.4(b). 
193. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1, cmt. 1 (1999). 
194. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2. 
195. ld. The signature of an attorney on a discovery request, notice, response, or 
objection is required, which certifies that, based on the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is consistent with the 
rules, has a good faith factual basis, is made for a valid purpose, and is not unreasona-
bly or unduly burdensome. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.3(c). 
196. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(d). 
197. /d. 
198. !d. Conferences are prohibited except for the purpose of determining whether a 
privilege should be asserted. ld 
199. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(e), 199.5(0 cmt. 4 (1999). 
200. Id. 
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it is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from 
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive or [if] the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit."201 The new rules thus establish a "pro-
portionality" limit upon discovery. 
Aside from the trifurcation of cases, the most important innova-
tion of the revised th,e Texas Rules w,as a new discovery device, "re-
quests for disclosure,'' by which parties may obtain basic discoverable 
information without objection, work product claims, unnecessary ex-
p,ense, or inconvenience.202 In Texas, requests for disclosure, unlike 
Rule 26(a)(l) of the Federal Rules, are obtainable only on demand.203 
By this tool, parties may obtain "the legal theories and factual bases 
of the responding part[ies'] claims or defenses," as_ well as basic dam-
age theory. 204 
Failure to fully respond is an abuse of the discovery process.205 
The Rules state that "[n]o objection or assertion of work product is 
permitted .... ".206 The following items may be dis_covered with a re-
quest for disclosure: "correct names of the parties to the lawsuit [and 
identity of potential parties]; legal theories and, in general, the fac-
tual bases of ... claims or defenses; the amount and any method of 
calculating economic damages; [identity] of persons having knowl-
edge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each person' connec-
tion with the case;" testifying expert's identity, general substance of 
opinions, documents, and resume; insurance agreements and settle-
ment agreements; witness statements; medical records and bills.207 
Documents must be served with the disclosure response, unless vo-
luminous, in which case the_ time and place for production must be 
stated. 208 Responses that have been amended or supplemented may 
be used for impeachment, except for disclosure of legal theories, fac-
tual bases of claims or defenses, and. damages. 209 [need to 
In an attempt to respond to criticisms that the disclosure re-
quirements violate the ethical and practical obligations of attorneys 
to clients, responding parties are not required to marshal evidence or 
brief legal positions.210 The rule also provides that responses to dis-











TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 (a)-(b). 
' ' 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, cmt. 1 (1999). 
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.1. 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2. 
TEX. R. CIV. P~ 194, cmt. 1 (1999). 
I 
TEX~ R. CIV. P. 194.5. 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2. 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.4. 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.6, cmt. 3 (1999). 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2, cmt. 2 (1999). 
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as admissions if a response is later changed by amendment or sup-
plementation.211 This presumably encourages parties to disclose and 
discuss their basic legal and factual assertions early in the case. 
2. Arizona 
Historically, Arizona civil procedure followed federal practice.212 
That congruence has now disappeared in many important subjects.213 
In September of 1990, a special committee, chaired by Thomas 
Zlaket,214 proposed major revisions to the discovery provisions of the 
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Arizona Rules") to make them 
"more efficient, more expeditious, less exp·ensive, and more accessible 
to the people.'~215 The committee concluded that existing practice in 
civil cases was causing undue expense and delay.216 Justice Zlaket 
wrote later, "huge numbers of interrogatories, marathon depositions, 
multiple experts, voluminous document requests, and other similar 
tactics have become today's norm."217 While the new rules were to 
eliminate unnecessary discovery, the committee was also explicit 
about the need to encourage greater professionalism among attor-
neys. "In recent years there-has also been an increase in abusive, ob-
structive and contentious behavior by members of the bar. Such con-
duct, unfortunately, is often expected and seemingly rewarded."218 
The ultimat~ goal of the Arizona amendments was to increase volun· 
tary cooperation and exchange of information. After soliciting public 
comment, and conducting an experiment with the proposed rules in a 
few trial courts in Maricopa County, the Arizona Supreme Court en-
acted the proposals effective July 1, 1992.219 
The new Arizona Rules embrace the concept of disclosure. Dis-
covery has largely been relegated to a process for filling gaps in the 
211. TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.6, cmt. 3 (1999). 
212. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1381. 
213. The Federal Rules were amended in 1993 and in 2000, and the difference be-
tween the two sets of rules has now become less stark. The 1993 Amendments to Rule 
26, for example, included (a)(l)-(4), mandatory duty to disclose basic information about 
witnesses, documents, and exhibits without request; (b)(2), power of court to limit 
depositions and interrogatories; (b)(4), right to depose expert witnesses; (b)(5), notice 
and specific basis for claimed protective order; (c) certification of efforts to resolve dis-
putes; (d) and (0 meeting before commencement of discovery; (g)(1) signatures on all 
disclosures. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
214. · Hon. Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
11, 11-13~ n.6 (1993). In 1992, Mr. Zlaket was appointed to the Arizona Supreme 
Court. Id. at n.6. The rules are commonly called the "Zlaket Rules." Id. at 12-13. 
215. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 cmt. (1991). 
216. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 3. 
217. ld. 
218. ld. at 4. 
219. Id. 
' 
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disclosure statements. The traditional discovery tools deposition, 
interrogatories, etc. are still available under new Arizona Rule 26.1, 
but they are subject to strict numerical limits. Moreover, the stan-
dard for disclosure, "any infortnation that the party believes may be 
relevant to the issues in the case,"220 is purposefully broad. It accords 
with the general premise of the new rules that disclosure should re-
move the adversarial component from the pretrial exchange of infor-
mation, confining the adversary process to trial.221 Attempts to avoid 
disclosure of information may trigger severe judicial sanctions. In-
deed the Court Comment to Rule 26.1 stresses the need to deal with 
abuses in a "strong and forthright fashion."222 
All parties are to disclose voluntarily all information necessary 
to process the case.223 This includes the factual and legal basis of each 
claim or defense, information about each witness, including experts, 
tangible evidence, relevant documents and more.224 Rule 26.1(a)(4) 
requires the disclosure of all witnesses who the party "believes" may 
have relevant knowledge, while Rule 26.1(a)(9) requires the produc-
tion of documents that the party "believes may be .relevant."225 Addi-
tional or amended di~closures are required "in no event more than 
thirty days after the [new or different] information is revealed to or 
discovered by the disclosing party .... "226 This includes simultaneous 
disclosure ·of all experts "expected to testify" at trial, together with 
"the subject matter," "substance of the facts and opinions," "summary 
of the grounds for each opinion," and "qualifications" of the expert. 
Any report prepared by the expert must also be disclosed. 227 The rule 
is to be enforced by sanctions imposed based on a "disclose it or lose 
it" philosophy; any information not timely disclosed is barred from 
trial except by leave of c.ourt for good cause shown.228 
Party-initiated discovery has been overtly limited. With the ex-
ception of "complex cases,"229 depositions of persons other than parties 
and expert witnesses are disallowed, and no deposition may exceed 
220. See ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(4). 
221. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1 cmt. (1991) 
222. Id. 
223. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a). New Rule 26.1 requires parties to simultaneously serve 
disclosure statements within forty days after the filing of a responsive pleading. ARIZ. 
R. Crv. P. 26.1(b). 
224. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(l)~(a)(9). 
225. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a). Probably to ensure that clients were also involved and 
appraised of the new rules, disclosure statements were required to be signed under 
oath by the party making the disclosure. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(d). 
226. Id. 
227. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l(a)(6). 
228. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c). Rule 26.l(c) was deleted in 1996 but a modified rule was 
incorporated into Rule 37(c)(l)-(2). 
229. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 7. 
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four hours in length.230 Interrogatories, both uniform and non-
uniform, are limited to a total of forty, with each subpart to a non-
uniform interrogatory counted as a separate interrogatory.231 Re-
quests for production are limited to one set, containing not more than 
ten categories of items/32 and each side is restricted to twenty-five 
requests for .admissions, 233 Only one expert witness per side per issue 
is permitted to testify.234 
In theory, the Arizona Rules should accelerate the resolution of 
cases and decrease cost. Information is available sooner and without 
the necessity for formal discovery devices. However, no statistical 
confirmation of these premises is available and no studies have been 
performed regarding the effect of the rules despite the fact that the 
rules have been in effect for more than nine years. Prior to adopting 
the disclosure-discovery changes statewide, however, Arizona imple-
mented the rules in a test program in a single county.235 The superior 
court was assigned 8,288 cases under the proposed revised rules dur-
ing an eighteen~month period,236 and reported the results were prom-
ising. Cases using the new procedures were terminated almost two 
months earlier on average than cases using traditional discovery 
methods, and depositions and other discovery devices were used far 
less.237 In complex cases, however, disclosure seemed to make no dif-
ference in the use of the traditional discovery devices. 238 Attorneys 
who handled cases under the new system commented that disclosure 
significantly reduced the amount of time needed to exchange infor-
mation for appropriate resolution of cases.239 
· Application of the new Arizona Rules has lead to a series of ap-
pellate decisions tempering the disclosure requirement. In Bryan v. 
Riddell,240 a trial court barred certain witnesses who had not been 
disclosed from .testifying. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, be-
cause, although the disclosure "statement" was incomplete, the rele-
vant information had been given to the opposing counsel in other dis-
covery.241 The Court noted: 
The disclosure rules must be interpreted in harmony with their 
230. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(a), (d). 
231. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a). 
232. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 34(b). 
233. See AR.lZ. R. Crv. P. 36(b). 
234. See ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 43(g). 
235. Myers, supra note 214, at 11-.13 & n.6. 
236~ Id. at 20. 
237. Id. 
238. ld. 
239.. ld. at 23. 
240. 875 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1994). 
241. ld. at 135 & n.5-. 
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underlying philosophy and purpose ~ ... Ordinarily, therefore; the 
disclosure statement is the primary vehicle by which the parties 
are informed of their opponent's case .... Here, however, the dis• 
closure statements was not so critical, as discovery was essentially 
complete. 242 
• 
A similar situation was presented in Allstate [n,surance Co. u. 
O'Toole. 243 Although the disclosure statement of the plaintiff was not 
timely, the Supreme Court construed the "good cause" exception for 
application of sanctions liberally. No trial date had yet been set in 
the case, and the court affirmed the trial court's. refusal to exclude 
untimely disclosed information.244 Subsequently, Rule 37(c) was 
amended to allow trial courts considerable discretion whether to al-
low untimely disclosed material to be used.245 
3. Illinois 
The Illinois Supreme Court significantly amended its state's civil 
discovery rules effective January 1, 1996. The Illinois Supreme Court 
Rules (the "Illinois Rules") were,modeled on the Discovery Guidelines 
adopted by the National Conference of State Trial Judges. The new 
rules provide for much greater judicial involvement and discretion in 
managing the pretrial phase. In addition, for selected cases, a new 
set of rules requiring mandatory disclosure and limiting discovery is 
imposed. These rule changes were intended to curb unnecessary ex-
penses, delays and abuses. 
a. Pretrial Management 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218 requires pretrial management 
of cases by trial judges to an extent previously unseen in Illinois 
practice. Although traditional discovery devices are still available, 
trial courts have broad authority to supervise the process.246 Each 
trial judge is required to hold an initial case management conference 
within thirty-five days after the case is at issue.247 At this conference, 
the trial court and parties are to first evaluate the case and consider 
242. ld. at 136. 
243. 896 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1995). 
244. Id. at 258-59; see also Aguirre v. FQrrest, 923 P.2d 859, 863 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1996) (affirming the trial court's decision to allow an untimely disclosed e~pert totes· 
tify). 
245. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 3'7(c); see also State Bar Committee Notes (1996 & 1997 
Amendments). 
246. ILL. S. CT. R. 20l(c). 
247. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a). No. more than 182 days after the filing of the complaint to 
hold this conference. I d. The Rule requires that the conference be attended by "counsel 
familiar with the case and authorized to act.'' Id. 
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its "nature, issues, and complexity.''248 The type and amount of pre-
trial information gathering permitted is to reflect the specific nature 
of each case. The order issued after this conference controls all pre-
trial processes. 249 
Under Rule 218, the trial court may determine what discovery 
will be permitted, including specific limits on the number and dura-
tion of depositions and the number of opinion witnesses that can be 
called to testify.250 The trial court is to set a date for a subsequent 
management conference to adjust the process as warranted by inter-
vening developments.251 Deadlines for the completion of all disc~very 
and the setting a trial date are mandated. 25·2 The deadlines for the 
completion of discovery must be at least sixty days before the date on 
which the "trial court reasonably anticipates the trial will com-
mence."253 Continuing judicial supervision of the pretrial process is 
also envisioned. As the Committee Comments to the Rule state: "By 
regulating discovery on a case .. specific basis, the trial court will keep 
control of the litigation and thereby prevent the potential for discov-
ery abuse and delay which might otherwise result."254 
b. Pretrial Limitations and Sanctions 
Under Illinois Rule 201(k) the parties are admonished to "facili-
tate discovery under these rules and ... make reasonable attempts to 
resolve differences over discovery."255 The Rule also requires that the 
attorneys ultimately responsible for trying the case be involved in 
personal consultation about discovery matters.256 Trial and discovery 
are thus seen as an integrated process, although this may be at odds 
• 
248. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a)(l). The Committee Comments to Rule 218(a)(l) describe 
the goals as follows: 
The new rule recognizes that each case is a composite of variable factors in-
cluding the nature, number and complexity of the substantive and proce-
dural issues which are involved, the number of parties and potential wit-
nesses as well as the type and economic value of the relief sought. Less com-
plex cases with limited damages and fewer parties require less discovery and 
involve less time to prepare than do cases with multiple complex issues in-
volving numerous parties and damages or other remedies of extraordinary 
economic consequence. By focusing upon each case within six months after it 
is filed, the court and the parties are able to formulate a case management 
plan which avoids both the potential abuses and injustices that are inherent 
in the previous "cookie cutter" approach. 
249. Id. 2l8(c). 
250. ILL. 8. CT. R. 2l8(a)(5). 
251. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(b) & comm. cmts. 
252. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(c). 
253. Id. 
254. ILL. S. CT. R. 218(c) & comm. cmts. 
255. ILL. S. CT. R. 201(k)~ 
256. Id. 
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with much contemporary practice.257 
Significant restrictions are placed on discovery. Illinois Rule 
206(d) limits any deposition to three hours, except by agreement of 
the parties or order of the court.258 In multi-party litigation, this re-
quires coordination among attorneys for clients that may have con-
flicting interests. All objections at depositions must "be concise, stat-
ing the exact legal nature of the objection."259 No more than thirty in-
terrogatories are permitted,260 a limitation ·apparently in response to 
complaints of "needless, repetitious and burdensome interrogato-
ries."261 A duty is imposed to supplement or amend prior answers to 
interrogatories '':seasonably."262 Simultaneously, the Supreme Court 
adopted form interrogatories by administrative order,263 which were 
accompanied by incentives to encourage their use. 264 Each form inter-
rogatory used counts as one, notwithstanding the fact that it might 
have numerous sub-parts. 265 If. a non-form interrogatory containing 
subparts is propounded by a party; each of those subparts is counted 
against the allotted thirty interrogatories. 266 The identity of all opin-
ion witnesses, whether expert or lay, must be disclosed together with 
their conclusions and opinions. 267 This req~irement is applicable to all 
cases, regardless of the amount of damages demanded. 
In the event that the parties or counsel do not comply with the 
new rules, a series of sanctions ·are enumerated, 268 such as barring. 
257. ILL. S. CT. R. 20l(k) & comm. cmts. 
258. ILL. S. CT. R. 206(d). 
·259. ILL. S. CT. R. 206(c)(3). Rule 207(a) was amended to permit a deponent to make 
only those corrections to the transcript which are "based on errors in reporting or tran-
scription." ILL. S. CT. R. 207(a) ("The deponent may not otherwise change either the 
form or substance of his or her answers.-"). 
260. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(c). 
261. ILL. S. CT. R. 213 (c) & comm. cmts. 
262. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(i). 
263. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(j). 
264. The Illinois procedure is similar to that employed in other states. See, e.g., 
CONN. SUPER, CT. R. § 73-6(b); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a); S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b) (l)-(b)(7). 
265. ILL. S. CT .. R. 213(j) & Standard lnterrogs. under S. CT .. R. 213(j). 
266. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(j) & Standard lnterrogs. under S. CT. R. 213(j). 
267. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(g), 213(g) cmt., 218(a)(5). 
268. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c). In the event of discovery abuse, it appears that Illinois 
courts have available to them any sanction thought to be properly exercisable by a 
trial court. Rule 219(c) specifically authorizes the imposition of the follQwing sanctions: 
(i) That further proceedings be stayed until the order or rule is complied 
with; 
(ii) That the offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading re-
lating to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates; 
(iii) That the offending party be debarred from maintaining any particular 
claim, counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense relating to that 
• ISsue; 
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testimony, striking pleadings, entering judgment, together with a 
catchall power to enter "s-uch orders as are just."269 The trial court is 
authorized to impose an "appropriate sanction" upon a party, a 
party's attorney, or· both.27? In addition, Rule· 219(a) and (b) provide 
' 
for the payment of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees when an 
abuse of discovery is found. 271 The trial judge may impose against a 
party or a party's attorney "a monetary penalty" where the conduct is 
found to be willful and may also conduct contempt proceedings.272 
c. Mandatory Disclosure and Discovery Limits in 
. . ( 
Cases lnvolvtng Less Than $50,000 
Another major reform in Illinois was the imposition of manda-
tory· disclosure requirements and strict limitations on discovery in 
civil actions seeking money damages not in excess of $50,000,273· a 
limit particularly significant given that more than ninety percent of 
cases filed in Illinois are estimated to fall within this category.274 If a 
judgment is rendered in excess of that amount, Rule 222(b) requires 
a post-trial reduction of judgment "to an amount not in excess of 
$50,000.'' Any party seeking damages may invoke the mandatory dis-
closure rules as well as the limitations on traditional discovery pro-
cedures. On the other hand, the party from whom damages are 
sought is afforded the protection of a damage cap.275 
Disclosure of information and documents is to occur automati-
cally; no request is needed.276 The requirement for disclosure is im-
I d. 
(iv) That a witness be barred from testifying concerning-that issue; 
(v) That, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that is-
sue is material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending 
party or that the offending party's action be dismissed with or without 
prejudice.; or 
(vi) That any portion of the offending party's pleadings relating to that issue 
be stricken and, if thereby made appropriate, judgment be entered as to 
that issue. 
(vii) That in cases where a tnoney judgment is entered against a party sub-
ject to sanctions under this subparagraph, order the offending party to 
pay interest at the rate provided by law for judgments for any period of 
pretrial delay attributable to the offending party's conduct. 
269. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c). 
270. Id. 
271. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(a)-(b). 
272. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c). 
273. ILI~. S. CT. R. 222. ("[The] [r]ule does not apply to small claims, ordinance viola-
tions, actions brought pursuant to 750 ILCS, and actions seeking equitable relief."). 
274. Steven F. Pflaum & FaustinA. Pipal, Jr., Successful Practice Under the New 
Illinois Discovery Rules, 9 CHI. B AsS'N. REC. 20, 28 (1995). 
275. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(b). 
276. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(c). 
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posed immediately upon the filing of a party's affidavit stating 
whether the total of money damages requested exceeds $50,000.277 
Disclosure must be accomplished "within 120 days after the filing of 
a responsive pleading to the complaint, counter-complaint, third 
party complaint, etc." unless otherwise agreed to by the parties or or-
dered by the court.278 The information and documents to be disclosed 
include: (1) the factual basis of each claim or defense; (2) the legal 
theory upon which each claim or defense is based including citations 
of pertinent legal or case authorities where necessary for a reason-
able understanding of the claim or defense; (3) the names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers of any witnesses whom the disclosing party 
expects to call at trial with a designation of the subject matter about 
which each witness might be called to testify; (4) the names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of all persons whom the party be-
lieves may have knowledge or information relevant to the events, 
transactions, or occurrences that gave rise to the action, and the na-
ture of that knowledge or information; (5) the names, addresses, and 
telephone numbers of all persons who have given statements, and the 
custodian of the copies of those statements; ( 6) the names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers of each person whom the disclosing party ex-
pects to call as an opinion witness at trial, the subject matter, conclu-
sions, and opinions of the opinion witness and the bases therefore, 
the qualifications of the opinion witness, and copies of any reports 
prepared by the opinion witness; (7) a computation and measure of 
damages alleged by the disclosing party, and the basis for the compu-
• 
tation; (8) the exist.ence, location, custodian, and general description 
of any tangible evidence or documents to be used at trial and rele-
. 
vant insurance agreements; (9) a list of the documents that are 
known by a party to exist, whether or not in the party's possession, 
custody, or control and that that party believes may be relevant to 
the subject matter of the action, and those which appear reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 279 A copy of 
each document listed shall be served with the disclosure. 280 Rule 
222(c) imposes a continuing duty "seasonably supplement or amend 
disclosures whenever new or different information or documents be-
come known to the disclosing party." 
Intertwined with these automatic disclosures .are the strict limits 
on the traditional discovery procedures codified in Illinois Rule 222. 
In each case valued at $50,000 or less, the number of interrogatories 
may not exceed thirty.281 No discovery deposition may exceed three 
277. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(b). • 
278. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(c). 
279. I d. 
280. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d)(l)-(9). 
281. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(0(1). 
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hours without agreement of the parties.262 Discovery depositions may 
be taken only of parties and treating physicians and opinion wit-
nesses identified as testifying at trial.283 No evidence depositions are 
permitted except where a trial witness is likely to be unavailable or 
where "exceptional circumstances exist."284 Under Rule 222, the par-
ties must disclose the identity of trial witnesses and of trial docu-
ments or tangible evidence.285 Under the prior rules, these were be-
yond the scope of discovery. The disclosure requirements are enforced 
under a "disclose it or lose it" philosophy;286 non-complying evidence 
is to be excluded at trial. In addition to this remedy, a trial court may 
impose "any other sanction."287 Whether such judicial action is 
enough to force a party to disclose unfavorable evidence will be tested 
by actual practice. 
4. Colorado 
Colorado was the second state in the country to adopt the Fed-
eral Rules as its own state rules in 1941.288 Over the intervening pe-
riod, Colorado has generally followed the changes introduced in the 
federal rules.289 Completing a process initiated in 1992, the Colorado 
Supreme Court adopted revised discovery rules with the Colorado 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (the "Colorado Rules"), effective January 1, 
1995. The most dramatic change in the Colorado Rules was the addi-
tion of a new disclosure system, patterned largely after the 1993 
Amendments to Federal Rule 26. Differences between the state and 
federal rules are to accommodate the state disclosure/discovery re-
quirements in the new case/trial management system set forth in 
Colorado Rule 16.29° Colorado, however, applies different rules in dif-
ferent types of cases; domestic relations, juvenile and other proceed-
ings have their own sets of rules.291 Moreover, in 2000, Rule 26.3 was 
adopted, providing special procedures for disclosure, alternate dis-
282. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(0(2). 
283. ILL. S. CT. R. 222 (f)(2)(a)-(b). 
284. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(0(3). 
285. See ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d). 
286. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(g). 
287. Id. 
288. Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1384. 
289. Duran v. Lamm, 70 P.2d 609, 613 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that construc-
tion of the Federal Rules by federal courts has always been considered as pers\].asive 
authority by Colorado courts interpreting the state rules); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 26 
comm. cmt. (~Revised ColoR. Civ. P. 26 is patterned largely after Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, as 
amended .... "). 
290. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26 & comm. cmt. 
291. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclo-
sure (Domestic Relations)); COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2 (Case Management (Domestic Rela-
tions)). 
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pute resolution, and discovery and trial procedures for · "civil actions 
in which the claimant seeks monetary damages not exceeding 
$50,000."292 In another ·exception, special "Simplified Rules" for cases 
involving less than $100,000 were implemented in 2000 in two coun .. 
ties as an experiment designed to promote quick and economical dis-
position of such claims. 
Mandatory disclosure and explicit limits on traditional discovery 
are the central themes of the 1995 amendments to the Colorado 
Rules. The triggering mechanism for disclosure is the date when a 
case is "at issue," defined as when "all parties have been served[,] all 
pleadings permitted filed, or when the court directs."293 Once a case is 
at issue the lawyers must confer within fifteen days, transmit all 
mandatory disclosure within thirty days, and submit a proposed case 
management order within forty-five days. 294 Once a case management 
order is entered, it controls the subsequent course of the pretrial 
process until a trial management order is entered. 295 The Colorado 
Rules also require counsel to "certify that they have advised their cli-
ents of the estimated costs and fees" of conducting discovery.296 Cli-
ents are thus presumably better-informed consumers of the legal ser-
vices they are purchasing and may better calculate the costs and 
benefits of litigating the claim. 
The disclosure required, without formal request, includes the 
identity of every individual "likely to have discoverable information," 
a list of all relevant documents, a computation of damages and any 
relevant insurance agreements.297 In the case management order, if 
documents have not been ~ttached, parties are required to provide 
dates when the disclosures will be made.298 The parties must also es-
tablish a date for identifying witnesses and exhibits to be introduced 
at trial that have not been disclosed and a discovery schedule includ-
ing the timing and number of paper discovery to be used.299 
The 1995 revisions to the Colorado Rules also implemented strict 
numerical limitations on the quantity of discovery. "A party may take 
one deposition of each adverse party and of two other persons;"300 in-
terrogatories may not exceed thirty;301 requests for production and 
292. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.3 (Limited Monetary Claim Actions). 
293. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
294. ld. 
295. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3). 
296. COLO. R. Crv. P. 16(b)(l)(IV). 
297. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), 16(b); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(l)(lll). 
298. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(l)(II). 
299. COLO. R. Crv. P. 16(b)(l)(III)-(IV). 
300. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(A). 
301. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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requests for admissions are both limited to twenty.302 Pattern inter-
rogatories were adopted and encouraged.303 Subparts of non-pattern 
interrogatories count as separate interrogatories for purposes of cal-
culating numerical limits, whereas subparts in pattern interrogato-
ries are not counted.304 Colorado Rule 37, the sanctions provision, was 
amen.ded to include the disclosure procedures as well as the discovery 
process.305 Failure to provide disclosure bars presentation of undis-
closed evidence at trial or on a summary judgment motion "unless 
such failure is harmless."306. The court may impose reasonable ex-
penses and attorney's fees for such failure as well.307 
Effective July 1, 2000, in cases "in which the claimant seeks 
monetary damages not exceeding $50,000," new procedures are im-
plemented in all Colorado District Courts for "Limited Monetary 
Claim . Actions."308 In such cases, ''the disclosure rules of Colorado 
. 
Rule 26(A)" apply except: the parties make disclosures ."no later than 
21 days after the case. is at issue[; in] personal injury cases, the plain-
tiff [must] disclose all healthcare providers and employers for the 
past ten years and the defendant [must] disclose the present claim 
case file [and] . . . any evidence supporting affirmative defenses."309 
The parties must attend a non-binding alternate dispute resolution 
meeting within 120 days of the date the case is at issue and may 
agree to a binding .form of ADR.310 Prior to the ADR, the only deposi-
tion a party may take is. th.at of the adverse party311 and the 
deposition of an expert may be used at trial without a showing of un-
availability. 312 
a. Simplified Procedure Rules 
The Colorado Supreme Court recently adopted Simplified Proce-
dure Rules (the "Colorado Simplified Rules") for a pilot project in two 
Colorado counties for cases filed after March of 2000.313 The experi-
ment is expected to last from eighteen to twenty-four months and is 
302. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(D) (limiting production); COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(E) 
(limiting admissions). 
303. COLO. R. Crv. P. 33(e). 
304. ld. 
305. COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(a); COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(2)(A). 
306. COLO. R. Crv. P. 37(c)(l). 
307. ld. 
308. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3. 
309. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.3(c). 
310. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3(d)(e). 
311. COLO. R. Crv. P. 26.3(d)(l)(A). 
312. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.3(g). 
313. Because the Colorado Rules of Simplified Procedure are part of a pilot pro-
gram, they are as of yet unpublished. They can be obtained from the Colorado Office of 
the State Court Administrator. A copy is on file with the author. 
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designed to test the effectiveness of a pared down pretrial process. 
These new Colorado rules carry the logic of prior changes in pretrial 
procedure in Colorado and other states several steps further. 314 They 
separate classes of cases by the amount of recovery sought (the Sim· 
plified Rules are used if less than $100,000 is sought) and substitute 
a limited mandatory disclosure regime for almost all discovery rights 
of the parties. In return, those choosing to use the new pretrial sys-
tem are given early trial settings and speedy trials. The Colorado 
• 
Simplified Rules are premised on a diagnosis of current ills in the 
civil justice system, such as its failure to distinguish between major, 
complicated disputes and . those that might be tried effectively with 
little or no pretrial discovery, its high costs, and its slow processing of 
cases. Together these faults rob civil litigants of an opportunity for a 
')ust, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."315 
As the name implies, the goal of the "simplified procedure" is to 
dramatically reduce the flow of paper between the parties, the meet-
ings required to create case and trial management orders under 
Colorado Rule 16, and the time and expense of pretrial litigation. 
Almost all of the by-now traditional discovery devices of the Colorado 
Rules (and the rules of all other states, plus the Federal Rules) in-
cluding depositions, interrogatories, requests for production of docu-
ments and requests for admission, are barred.316 In place of the stan-
• 
dard discovery devices, the simplified rules retain the mandatory dis-
closure provisions of Rule 26(a)(l), which require disclosure of wit-
nesses or persons likely to have discoverable information; relevant 
documents, data compilation and tangible things; a computation of 
damages claimed; and insurance policies concerning "disputed facts 
alleged with particularity in the pleading."317 Such disclosures must 
be completed within thirty days after the case is at issue.318 Addi-
tional exchange of information, in addition to normal disclosure re-
quirements included under Colorado Rule 26(a)(l), is also required. 
Thus, for example, in tort actions seeking damages, plaintiffs must 
disclose medical information and sign waivers allowing defendants to 
obtain the medical records.319 For employment cases, plaintiffs must 
314. See generally Richard P. Holme, Just, Speedy and Inexpensive: Possible Simpli-
fied Procedure for Cases Under $100,000, 29 COLO. LAW. 5 (2000). 
315. COLO. R. CIV. P. l(a). 
316. It should be noted that aside from the provisions that are made inapplicable, 
i.e., Rules 16, 26-34 and 36, all of the remaining standard Colorado Civil Procedure 
Rules continue to apply. Thus, pleading requirements, Rule 12 motions, third-party 
practice, and other rules regarding pretrial practice, trial, and post-trial matters are 
unchanged. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c). 
317. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l); COLOR. CIV. P. 26(a). 
318. Id. 
319. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(l)(B)(I). 
2002] REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY 635 
provide prior employment history documentation, demonstrate ef-
forts to find work since the unfavorable employment action, and sign 
waivers allowing access to their prior personnel files.320 The defen-
dant in such an action must produce the plaintiffs personnel file. 321 
Colorado Simplified Rule l.l(c)(l)(B)(iii) also allows either party to 
designate additional specific information and documentation that the 
party believes should be disclosed. Such demands must be made in 
writing, and a refusal by the opponent to provide the requested in-
formation or a response thereto may be subject to a motion for disclo-
sure or sanctions under Colorado Simplified Rule 37.322 
Although a large number of normal discovery devices are dis-
carded by the Colorado Simplified Rules, some are retained. Existing 
provisions of Colorado Rule 26 that remain in effect include the form 
and filing of disclosures,323 claims of privilege,324 protective orders325 
and supplementation of disclosures.326 Requests for document produc-
tion are permitted, but only for the purpose of inspecting documents 
and other eVidentiary materials disclosed under the mandatory dis-
closure requirements.327 
The Colorado Simplified Rules also alter practice with respect to 
depositions.328 Because recovery is capped at $100,000 for cases under 
these rules, the use of expert witnesses is not likely to be frequent. 
The provisions of Colorado Rule 26(a)(2.)(A) and (B) requiring written 
disclosures for expert witnesses are retained, however, and Colorado 
Simplified Rule l.l(c)(4) allows depositions of expert witnesses to be 
used at trial. The parties would thus have to conduct their examina~ 
tions of the expert deponent as if it were at the trial; no second ap-
pearance would occur. This undoubtedly decreases the cost for expert 
fees, but increases the risks and stakes of the deposition. Once such a 
deposition is taken, any party may introduce it into evidence even 
though the noticing party may have changed its mind and decided it 
did not want to introduce the expert's testimony. 
320. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B)(II). 
321. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l). 
322. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B)(iii). The Colorado rules provide a variety of 
remedies for improperly withholding information in pretrial procedures.: precluding 
evidence at trial that was not disclosed; requiring payment of expenses, including at-
torneys fees caused by the failure to disclose; judicially designating facts as being es-
tablished for purposes of the litigation; striking all or parts of the resisting party's 
pleadings; and even entering default judgment for failure to comply with pretrial obli-
gations. COLO. R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
323. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(4). 
324. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
" 325. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
326. COLO. R .. CIV. P. 26(e). 
327. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(B); COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(l)(B). 
328. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED .P. l.l(c)(2). 
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The only othe.r depositions allowed are those taken in the event a 
party knows that a necessary witness will be unavailable at trial.329 
Even if the witness is later available, the deposition must still be in-
troduced.330 Depositions for the sake of obtaining documents from 
third parties are still available, and these documents may still be 
subpoenaed under Colorado Simplified Rule 45. 331 . 
The Colorado Simplifi~d Rules make important changes in other 
ways. They require an exchange of a "detailed statement of the ex-
pected testimony" for each witness the party intends to call at trial if 
that party's deposition has not been taken.332 Surprise. testimony is 
ruled out; testimony by a witness that is outside the scope of the 
matter disclosed in this written disclosure is to be excluded.333 These 
. . . 
detailed statements regarding plaintiff's witnesses are equivalent to 
the information exchanged regarding experts and are due at least 
ninety days before trial; the corresponding disclosure of testimony of 
witnesses for the defendant is due sixty days before trial and the dis-
closure for rebuttal witnesses, forty-five days before trial.334 If a party 
were to call an adverse party or hostile witness, the only limitation 
on the scope of such testimony would be a limitation to those m~tters 
that had been previously disclosed.335 If there had been no agreement 
regarding the authenticity of exhibits., witnesses could be presente.d 
on that narrow issue alone.336 It should also be noted that any volun-
• 
tary discovery agreed to by all parties is permitted under the Simpli-
• 
fied Rules. 337 · 
The parties-, well in advance of the trial date, would then possess 
all testimony of witnesses, whether lay or expert, documents, and 
other materials and could then be expected to make an informed as-
• 
sessment of their own and their opponent's claims in time to avoid 
last .. minute settlement negotiations "on the courthouse steps." Trial 
exhibits are to be identified and exchanged thirty days before trial, 
and the authenticity· of such documents is unquestioned unless writ-
ten objection is filed twenty days before trial.338 
The Colorado Simplified Rules provide a choice for litigants. Dis· 
covery rights· are exchanged for speed and limitations on discovery 
expense. The new rules represent a sharp departure from prior Colo-
329. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(4). 
330. ld. 
331. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(5). 
332. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(3). 
333. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(7). 
334. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(3). 
335. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(7). 
336. Id. 
337. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. l.l(c)(9). 
338. COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(6). 
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rado· civil procedure which has long modeled itself closely with the 
Federal Rules.339 In effect the procedure normally used in state 
criminal prosecutions is applied to selected civil cases. 340 To avoid 
disadvantaging parties in the counties in which they are applied, 
parties may simply opt out of the Colorado Simplified Rules and elect 
to have their cases proceed under the normal Colorado Rules.341 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment provides the opportunity to terminate litiga-
tion without trial. Summary judgment rules use the fruits of discov-
ery and the provisions of relevant affidavits as the basis for a pretrial 
disposition of the case. Judgment may be granted if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, show no genuine issue as to material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 342 A final 
determination without the opportunity for meaningful discovery, 
however, undermines many aspects of our current pretrial system. It 
is patently unfair to grant judgment without affording the losing 
party the opportunity to gather and submit evidence on his or her 
behalf. Fair and .accurate disposition of cases still remains dependent 
upon information gathering by parties. 
At the federal level, the relationship between the progress of dis-
covery and a trial court's consideration of summary judgment mo-
tions was stressed by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Cat-
trett.343 The Court found that "[a]ny potential problem with such pre-
mature motions can adequately be dealt with under Rule 56(f), which 
allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on 
the motion to be continued, if the non-·moving party h,as not had an 
opportunity to make full discovery."344 There is a clear link between 
pretrial dispositive motions and the status of discovery. The Chief 
Justice has noted that parties must have an opportunity for "full dis· 
covery" before a court may enter judgment.345 The Supreme Court in 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 346 again emphasized that summary 
judgment must not be granted prematurely. Although that case em-
phasized that the non-movant must come forward with specific facts 
339. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
340. See Holme, supra note 314, at 8. 
341. COLO. R. CIV. P. l.l(a)(2)(b). 
342. See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510(c); KAN. CODE CIV. P. § 60-
256. 
343. 477 u.s. 317 (1986). 
344. Id. at 326. 
345. Id. 
346. 477 u.s. 242, 251 (1986). 
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that demonstrate the existence of an issue for trial, the Court noted 
that this was "qualified by Rule 56(f)'s provision that summary 
judgment be refused where the non-moving party has not had the 
opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposi-
tion."347 
• 
It is difficult to determine whether the use of summary judgment 
in the state courts has increased since the onset of limits on discov-
ery. Reported appellate decisions are clearly an inexact measure. The 
vast majority of cases ended by motion practice at the trial court 
level are never appealed, and thus rarely appear in published opin-
ions. Reading reported state appellate cases over a considerable pe-
riod of time leaves me with the impression that many more cases and 
issues are now decided without trial than before. I candidly admit no 
statistical proof of this observation is available at the moment with 
respect to the state courts. 
At the federal level, attempts have been made to document the 
premise that proportionately fewer cases are tried in the district 
courts than a generation ago, and that summary dispositions, espe-
cially by Federal Rule 56, of cases has increased.348 The percentage of 
civil cases proceeding to trial in the federal courts plunged from 8.5% 
of all pending civil cases in 1973 to just 2.3% in 1999.349 This is par-
ticularly noteworthy because summary judgment is typically a 
weapon for defendants350 and the district courts are now highly recep-
tive to such motions.351 An analysis of all published federal court deci-
sions in the first quarter of 1988 concluded "summary judgments 
were awarded to defendants in whole or in part in ninety-eight cases 
and denied in only twenty-four."352 Summary judgment and other pre-
347. Id. at 250 n.4. 
348. See, e.g., Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. 
L. REV. 141 (2000). The author reviewed twenty volumes of the Federal Reporter dur-
ing 1973 and during 1997 to 1998 and reported a marked increase in summary dispo-
sitions of civil cases. I d. at 143. He found that "(i]n the later sample, Rule 56 decisions 
predominate the reported civil cases and Rule 56 is used far more integrally to resolve 
claims." Id. at 165. 
349. Id. at 140. 
350. Judge Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment: Boon or Burden, 37 JUDGE'S J., 
Summer 1998, at 26 (federal magistrate jtidge posits that summary judgment provides 
defendants with several tactical advantages: it forces plaintiff to present her case be-
fore trial, to incur substantial additional expense, and to delay resolution or settle-
ment of the case). 
351. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1938 
(1998) (D.C. Circuit Judge decries "unseemly rush to summary judgment"); see also, 
Mollica, supra note 348, at 87-94 (surveying post-Celotex decisions in the lower federal 
courts and concluding summary judgment by federal district judges is no longer rare 
or uncommon). 
352. Professors Issacharoff and Loewenstein surveyed 140 contested summary 
judgment motions. Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts 
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tr~al dispositive motions tend to favor repeat players and more affiu~ 
ent parties largely employers, corporations, insurers, etc typically 
defendants.353 Professor Risinger stresses this point: 
[L]ook at the practical position of plaintiffs. Something close to a 
one page form motion by defendant can throw on the plaintiff the 
responsibility to dredge, structure, collate and cross-reference all 
materials in the file to make them available to the judge before 
trial. Because the material must be reduced to a coherently struc-
tured written form, this task can sometimes take as long or longer 
than actually trying the· case. 354 · 
As Professor Thornburg has pointed out ''[d]iscovery in particu· 
. 
lar is an area in which decisions about the scope of discovery and the 
process for undertaking it create predictable advantages and disad-
vantages for predictable types of litigants."355 Limits on information 
gathering, together with increased use of summary judgment, pro· 
vide defendants with major tactical advantages. First, a plaintiff is 
forced to engage in a paper mini-trial, just to ensure that her case 
goes forward. Repeat player-defendants typically have the resources 
to make motions that plaintiffs attorneys do not.'356 Second, summary 
judgment motions allow defendants to view the critical elements of 
plaintiff's claim in advance of trial. Even is such a motion is lost, de-
fendant may still prevail at trial; a losing plaintiff has no such "sec-
ond chance." Third, such motions may force plaintiff to complete dis.-
covery at unfavorable or inopportune times, in order to ensure plain-
tiff has put her best case forward. Fourth, very often defendants will 
not commence settlement negotiations until the plaintiff has sur-
vived a motion for summary judgment. As a result, cases are often 
delayed, and delay typically favors defendants. 
It is true that often changes in state pretrial practice provide for 
mandatory disclosure of information by both sides as well as limits 
on discovery. But many of the state disclosure rules apply to a re-
stricted base of information, i.e., "disputed facts pleaded with par-
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 92 (1990). Of these, 122 were made by 
defendants and only 18 by plaintiffs. ld. They concluded that "courts are encouraging 
the filing of summary judgment motions." I d. 
353. ld. See generally Denlow, supra note 350. 
354. D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter·Revolution: A Summary 
Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 35, 41 (1988). 
3'55. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the ((Haves" a Little More: Considering the 
1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 S. M. U. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998). 
356. The use of summary judgment on behalf of defendants in employment dis-
crimination and civil rights cases has often been noted. See, e.g., Mark S. Dichter and 
Debra L. Casey, Practicing Law lnst., Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases: 
1995 at 1 (1995); RICHARDT. SEYMOUR, ALI-ABA, ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
LITIG. 169 (1993). 
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ticularity in the pleadings."357 Under such rules, plaintiffs will be pro-
vided information only in areas in which they are able to allege spe-
cific facts before discovery. For most plaintiffs, this may not be much 
help. The restrictive scope of disclosure, combined with the limited 
availability of traditional discovery mechanisms may thus operate in 
tandem to disadvantage them. Initial disclosure rules may also be a 
back door to more intensively fact-dominated pleadings, where law· 
suits can only be brought by those with pre-suit ability to marshal 
important facts. 358 . 
VII. INFORMATION SHARING IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
As described earlier, a number of states have revised their pre-
trial rules to mandate information sharing, restrict discovery be-
tween p~arties, and legislate civility in the pretrial process.359 The 
process is to be less adversarial, less costly, and less time consuming; 
information is to be available to parties sooner and exchanged with 
less formality than at present. Trial judges are urged to use sanc-
tions and address abuses in a "strong and forthright fashion."360 In 
effect, the changes seek to limit an attorney's use of adversarial skills 
to trial, i.e., arguing the implications and consequences of facts al-
ready revealed. While disclosure of information is generally not con-
clusive it "may be contradicted by other evidence"361 or even inad-
missible at trial providing information to an opponent is substan-
tively and psychologically difficult in our system. 
Arizona,362 Illinois,363 and other states364 require a voluntary dis-
closure of information by parties to their opponents. The Arizona 
rules are the broadest .and may well be the harbinger of future ·devel-
357. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise directed by the court, a party 
shall, Without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: (a) the 
name, the address ... of each individual likely to have discoverable informa-
tion relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings ... 
(b) a listing, together with a copy of ... all documents, data compilations, 
and tangible things relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in 
the pleadings. 
ld. Contra ARz. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (which contains no such limitation to "facts alleged 
with particularity in the pleadings" regarding disclosure, witnesses, documents and 
other information). 
358. See, e.g., Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
809, 812-13 (1998). 
359. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text. 
360. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 ct. cmt. to 1991 amendment. 
361. See, e.g., ILL. S. -CT. R. 20l(j). 
362. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a). 
363. ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d) (imposing mandatory disclosure requirements and strict 
limits on discovery in actions seeking money damages not in excess of $50,000 ). 
364. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 26.1. 
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opments. Arizona Rule 26.1(a) provides that all parties are to disclose 
voluntarily all information necessary to process the case.. Included 
are nine specific items: (1) "[t]he factual basis of each claim or de-
fense";365 (2) "[t]he legal theor[ies] upon which each claim or defense 
is based;"366 (3) information concerning each witness., along "with a 
fair description of the substance of ... expected testimony;"367 ( 4) in-
formation concerning other persons who may have knowledge and 
the nature of that knowledge;368 (5) information concerning persons 
who have provided statements;369 (6) information concerning expert 
witnesses, including the content of their testimony and their qualifi-
cations;370 (7) "a computation and measure of damage[s] ... ";37i (8) 
''[t]he existence ... of any tangible evidence or relevant documents" 
intended to be used as exhibits and production thereof;872 and (9) a 
list of other documents that may be relevant.373 
The initial· disclosure is to be made "as fully as then possible"374 
and must include all information then "in the possession, custody, or 
contror' of the party, as well as information that can be "ascertained, 
learned or acquired by reasonable inquiry and investigation."375 The 
parties are re·quired to disclose information relevant not only to their 
claim or defense but to the opponents' contentions as well. This duty 
to disclose is ongoing, and parties must supplement their disclosures 
seasonably.376 The parties are admonished to facilitate discovery.377 
Arizona Justice Zlaket has written: 
(A]t the outset of a case the parties must make a full, mutual and 
simultaneous disclosure of all relevant infortnation known by or 
available to them and their lawyers. In other words, no more "hide 
the pea." No longer will it be advantageous to play games of seman-
tics ("If he'd have just asked the right question ... "). Hopefully, 
Rule 26.1 will eliminate the need for extensive discovery in most 
378 cases .... 
The goal is to achieve less expensive, faster and more equitable liti-
365. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a)(l). 
366. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(2). 
367. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(3). 
368. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(4). 
369. ARiz. R. CIV. P. ,26.l(a)(5). 
370. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(6). 
371. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(a)(7). 
372. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(8). 
373. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.1(a)(9). 
374. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l(b)(l). 
375. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(b)(3). 
376. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 26.l(b)(2). 
377~ I d. 
378. Zlaket, supra note 82, at 5. 
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gation results. · 
But can rule changes and exhortations from appellate judges 
bring about these results? I am dubious for a number of reasons. 
First, there is considerable dispute regarding the proposition that it 
is discovery that is the "problem" in civil c.as·es. As discussed ear-
lier,379 empirical data from studies of federal and state cases do not 
confirm the "discovery abuse" hypothesis. Nor is there compelling 
evidence that mandatory disclosure and concomitant restrictions on 
traditional discovery will bring about quicker and less expensive 
resolution of cases. The only large-scale study of which I am aware, 
that of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice in the federal courts, did 
not "support strongly the policy of mandatory early disclosure as a 
means of significantly reducing lawyer work hours and thereby re-
ducing the costs of litigation, or as a means of reducing time to dispo-
sition."380 A survey of 1000 lawyers by the ABA's Litigation Section 
likewise "provided no evidence that . . . disclosure had reduced dis-
covery costs or delays" or that it decreased conflict between adversar-
ies in the discovery process. 381 Indeed, by moving the time and cost of 
information gathering to an earlier phase, these changes may actu-
ally impede settlement. The resources already expended may deter 
parties from compromising laterj>382 Moreover, while many agree that 
the resolution of civil cases in state courts is far too slow, the causes 
may well lie elsewhere: the number and priority of criminal cases in 
state judicial systems, and the lack of judges and infrastructure-
courtrooms, personnel, etc. to promptly handle cases. 
Second, an even deeper problem may be the nature of our judi-
cial process. A system that promotes adversarial resolution of cases 
through the efforts of client-dedicated legal representatives cannot be 
expected to readily accommodate procedures that quickly and effi-
ciently provide information to the opponent. The roots of this are in 
the perception that the rules of professional conduct mandate aggres-
sive resistance to the opponent's interests.383 A lawyer "should act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf' according to the offi-
cial comment to Rule 1.3 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional 
379. See discussion supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
380. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 678 (1998); Willging et 
at, supra note 93, at 525. 
381. Kahalik, supra note 380, at 679 (quoting Kathleen L. Blaner et al., ABA, Man· 
datory Disclosure Survey: Federal Rule 26(A)(l) After One Year (1996)). 
382. See, e.g., Carol Campbell Cure, Practical Issues Concerning Arizona's New 
Rules of Civil Procedure: A Defense -Perspective, 25 Az. ST. L. J. 55, 62 (1992). 
383. See discussion infra notes 385-96 and accompanying text. 
' 
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Conduct (the "Model Rules").384 
The pretrial process is not an exception to this system, but is 
viewed as an integral part of the process,385 a collection of weapons to 
be used to help control the outcome of the dispute and promote the 
interest of one's own clients. The lawyer ''may take whatever lawful 
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or en-
deavor."386 The Supreme Court has even recognized that a lawyer's 
job is not necessarily to secure the truth and that, "[ w ]ithin the limits 
of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not 
only are his right but may be his duty."387 Attempts to increase volun-
tary cooperation and "limit the adversarial nature of the proceed-
ings"388 are understood to compromise the advocate's duty to "zeal-
ously assert[ ] the client's position" and to jeopardize the client's in-
terests.389 Rules requiring, for example, disclosure of witnesses who 
the party ''believes" have relevant knowledge appear to be an incur-
sion into the mental processes of the attorney and client in violation 
of the "work product" doctrine.390 Given this cultural context, are at-
torneys more likely to behave differently with respect to required dis-
closures than in responding to traditional interrogatories or other 
discovery demands? 
The ABA Section of Litigation Special Task Force on Ethics in-
terviewed a variety of lawyers and trial judges in two citieS.391 A fair 
conclusion from its data is that "the basic, overriding, dominant norm 
of the legal _profession, especially among litigators, is the norm of 
zealous advocacy of client's interests."392 In this context, lawyers con-
sider it legitimate to use tactics to throw opponents off balance and 
raise costs to the other side, so long as there is some arguably legiti-
mate purpose is served. Each request for information is treated as 
384. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1998). 
385. Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 714-16. 
386. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1999). Many lawyers under-
stand this to permit any conduct on the client's behalf that is not explicitly prohibited. 
The comparable provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, 
stated: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Although the Model Rules ate 
less explicit, its advocacy and confidentiality provisions seem similar to the Code. 
387. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted). 
388. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1 cmt. 
389. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1998). 
390. If the materials sought contain "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories of an attorney'' opinion work product, the materials are deserving of sp e-
cial protection. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 28, § 26 .. 64. 
391. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large Firm Litigators: 
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998). 
392. ld. at 733. 
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narrowly as possible, every claim of privilege or irrelevance is as-
serted as broadly as possible.393 
The general principle guiding discovery requests for documents is 
that defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide documents, but they 
. are entitled to be "aggressive," making the plaintiff's lawyer "work 
for what he wants," and withhold from relieving the plaintiffs law-
yer of the burden of preparing his own case.394 
In this culture, counsel seek to use the pretrial process to maximize 
information gathering and admissions from the opponent, while at 
the same time resisting the information obtained by, or given to, the 
adversary.395 "Where the object always is to beat every plowshare into 
a sword, the ·discovery procedure is employed variously as weap-
. 
onry."sgs 
Third, lawyers typically view their obligations and behavior in 
the context of specific cases. A client in a weak position in terms of 
• 
the law and facts, or one determined to deter future litigation and re-
sist disclosures that might har1n it in later lawsuits, is more likely to 
be obstructive and determined to raise costs for the other side than a 
client willing~to settle a matter or one that appraises its legal and 
factual position differently.397 These particular factors may well out-
weigh general rules mandating information sharing. 
Fourth, lawyers are, of necessity, also intensely practical. Many 
see rules requiring cooperation and disclosure as a threat to business 
interests. They believe clients prefer attorneys who use rules and 
procedures to the client's advantage and fear potential cli~nts will be 
reluctant to hire a lawyer who is viewed as "cooperative."398 When 
their interests are disadvantaged, clients may choose not to believe 
that this was the result of neutrally applied rules, but rather of the 
lawyer's lack of zeal. Concern about income and business has been 
reinforced by the increasing competition among firms for clients and 
among lawyers within firms who provide rewards based upon attract-
ing clients.399 The contingent fee lawyer has a strong incentive to con-
strue strictly what is considere·d "relevant" because the lawyer's fi-
• 
393. Gordon, supra note 391, at 712-13. 
394. ld. at 712. . 
395 . . See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, In Defense o{Discouery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 
263, 264 (1992) (concluding that discovery can be used to impose costs on opponents 
and avoid decision); Wolfson, supra note 95, at 18-19 (stating that discovery "gives im-
petus and opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of delay, deception, and unbri-
dled confro~tational advocacy"). 
396. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980). 
397. Gordon, supra note 391, at. 714. 
398. P .N. Harkins III, Sanctions for Failure to Disclose, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 161, 162 
(1992). 
399. Gordon, supra note 391, at 717, 730-731. 
2002] REDISCOVERING DISCOVERY 645 
nancial interest are at stake in addition to the client's. Attorneys on 
hourly retainer agreements may view protracted pretrial conflict as 
profit enh~ncing. Although some ,clients oversee discovery to assess 
costs, many do not. 
Fifth, lawyers are also trained to be skeptical; they fe,ar that an 
opponent's failure to disclose will not be uncovered, perhaps due to 
limitations on traditional discovery methods.400 Deposition time lim-
its, for example,401 may provide incentives to parties and their attor-
neys to use all available means to withhold relevant information, 
hoping it will not be reached within the time allowed by the rules to 
take depositions. Such actions are often claimed to be justified by the 
belief that opponents are taking illegitimate advantage of the discov-
ery process and not playing fairly by the rules. 
In this climate, rules are not likely to be complied with unless 
they are vigorously enforced. However, most trial judges intensely 
dislike getting involved in such disputes. Gordon contends that 
"[d]iscovery disputes are a nuisance .... [l]f a lawyer seeking to 
compel seeks sanctions, there is a litigation within the litigation, 
cross~ motions for sanctions .... [l]f we award sanctions, we are say-
ing, lets keep this pettifogging game going.402 
The failure of federal judges, for example, to sanction attorneys 
,and parties for violation of discovery rules has been widely dis-
cussed.403 Only the most egregious violations seem to result in effec-
tive s'anctions.404 "The whole system of Civil adjudication would be 
ground to a virtual halt if the courts were forced to intervene in even 
a.modest percentage of dis~overy transactions." 405 
Some argue that the changes in discovery rules in Arizona, Illi-
nois, Colorado, and other states have now created an ethical duty on 
• 
400. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(a) (limiting interrogatories to forty); ARIZ. R. CIV. 
P. 34(b) (limiting parties to one request for production not to include more than 10 dis-
tinct items or categories of items); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (limiting depositions to four 
hours in length). 
401. See e·.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 3,0(d) (imposing a four hour limitation); ILL. SUPER. 
CT. R. 206(d) (imposing a three hour limitation). 
402. Gordon, supra note 391, at 722. 
403. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives on Discovery Reform, 3 REv. 
LITIG. 51, 62-67 (1982) (describing the lack of sanctions for discovery abuse under 
Rules 11, 26(c), & 37; Frank F. Flegal, ,Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects and Reform, 3 
REV. LITIG. 1 (1983) at 15, 17-19, 24-25 (same); Wolfson, supra note 95, at 4 7-48 
(same). 
404. See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 81, at 217-218 (explaining that severe sanctions 
are only used in the most extreme cases); see also MAss. CONTINUING LEGAL Enuc., 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS 145-46 (1992) (providing a survey of judges of the 
District Massachusetts indicating that discovery sanctions are, rarely imposed except 
in the most egregious cases). 
405. In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
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the part of attorneys to the court to seek a full presentation of the 
facts, and that this trumps the attorney's duty of zealous representa-
tion of the client's interest.406 Civil counsel no longer can wait until 
opposing counsel asks for discovery; disclosure rules are the substi .. 
tute for such requests. If an attorney fails to make the voluntary dis-
closures affirmatively required, the attorney . has unlawfully ob-
• 
structed access or unlawfully concealed a document within the pro-
scription of Rule 3.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct which provides that "[a] lawyer shall no.t: (a) unlawfully obstruct 
another party's access to evidence.''407 Prior discovery provisions im-
posed no direct obligation on counsel to ensure that all discoverable 
information was transmitted to the opposing party; that was the 
function of the other side's skill and diligence in asking. Mandatory 
disclosure alters this balance, and some new ~les are unequivocal in 
requiring counsel and the parties to turn over information, even 
when contrary to their own interests. 
The contention is that new rules create for attorneys in private 
civil cases duties and status akin to that of the criminal prosecutor in 
criminal matters.408 In Brady v. Maryland,409 the Supreme Court held 
that the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is ma-
terial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution."410 The mandate of Brady "requires 
disclosure only of evidence that is both favorable to the defendant 
and 'material either to guilt or to punishment."'411 Not only exculpa ... 
tory, but mitigating evidence as well as evidence that relates to the 
credibility and reliability of a material government witness fall 
within this doctrine.412 In addition, Brady similarly requires the 
406. See, e.g., Colin Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and The Ethics of Man-
datory Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1993). 
407. The alleged "unlawfulness" is the violation of the disclosure requirement. Rule 
3.4(d) likewise imposes a duty of fairness to opposing party and counsel. Since lawyers 
are also under a duty to comply with prevailing rules of procedure, Rule 3.4(d) might 
also be said to be a specific application of Rule 3.4(c), Obedience to Rules of a Tribunal. 
408. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTIGE, THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3·3.11. 
409. 373 U.S. 83 (1963), modified by United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
410. Id. at 87. 
411. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985}; see also United States v. 
Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 
1198 (9th Cir. 1995). 
412. Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional Inst. 194 F.3d 547, 556 (4th Cir. 1999) 
("[I]mpeachment evidence is unequivocally subject t~o disclosure."); United States v. 
Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (extending the Brady requirements to evi-
dence drawing into doubt credibility of witness when witness' reliability may be de-
terminative of guilt or innocence). The Supreme Court has consistently held that evi-
dence which the defense can use to impeach a witness falls within the purview of 
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prosecution to examine the files to ascertain if there is anything ex-
culpatory in nature, and this duty cannot be delegated.413 The respon-
sibility of a public prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict.414 
Most civil lawyers feel no comparable ob.ligation.415 The tradi-
tional discovery provisions in civil litigation were intended to create a 
level playing field; each side had equal access to all relevant infortna-
tion. Through interrogatories, depositions, and other information 
gathering devices, each party had the opportunity to develop its case, 
and fueled by the lawyer's duty to act with "reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client,"416 truth would presumably 
emerge in the courtroom. The discovery rules were essentially akin to 
a referee in a prizefight; each party would do its best to win under 
the rules prescribed, as determined by the neutral judge or jury. I 
personally incline to an expansive inte~pretation of disclosure rules 
but it remains to be seen whether such provisions truly alter the 
shape of the American pretrial system, or whether they merely pro-
vide for more efficient dissemination of information that competent 
counsel would have sought anyway. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
The importance of pretrial processes in contemporary litigation 
ensures that procedural rules impact both society as a whole and mil-
lions of individuals and business entities. State pro~edural rules gov-
erning pretrial information gathering are in flux. While many states 
continue to follow the model of the Federal Rules, others are experi-
menting with innovations that follow quite different paths. These de-
velopments may be the harbinger of a future procedural regime, 
changing the traditional roles of both attor11eys and judges in civil 
litigation. 
Brady. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 (1999); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 
U.S. 419, 432-33 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985); Giglio v . 
. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 
(1976) ("[T]he proper standard ofmateriality must reflect [the] overriding concern with 
the justice of the finding of gUilt.") 
413. United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 
1127 (1997) (holding that an individual prosecutor has duty to learn of favorable evi-
dence in possession of others acting on government's behalO; United States v. Narciso, 
446 F. Supp. 252, 271 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
414. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.1L 
415. Gordon, supra note 391, at 710-18. 
416. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1999). 
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